

THE ONE CHILD POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON CHINESE FAMILIES

Barbara H. Settles, Ph.D.  
Professor of Individual and Family Studies  
University of Delaware  
Newark, DE 19716 USA  
<settlesb@UDel.Edu>

and

Xuewen Sheng, Ph.D.  
Post Doctoral Associate  
School of Human Environmental Sciences  
University of Arkansas  
Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA  
<xsheng@uark.edu>

With  
Yuan Zang  
<yuanzang@UDel.Edu>  
And  
Jia Zhao  
<zhaoj@UDel.Edu>  
Doctoral students  
University of Delaware  
Newark, DE 19716 USA

This paper is partially based on a previous one prepared for XV World Congress of Sociology,  
Brisbane, Australia, July, 7-13, 2002. Research Committee on Family

© B. H. Settles and X. Sheng 2008

This paper is "in press" in the Handbook of Families in Chinese Societies

One child policy

## THE ONE CHILD POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON CHINESE FAMILIES

## THE ONE CHILD POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON CHINESE FAMILIES

Current birth planning (jihua shengyu) program of People's Republic of China, featured by the one-child-per-couple policy (the one child policy), has been one of the largest and most dramatic population-control campaigns in the world, receiving both praise and sharp evaluation over the past quarter of a century. It has been so successfully implemented in China that the nation's population growth rate dropped significantly. This policy has been intensely criticized internationally for violating fundamental human rights evidenced by the forced sterilizations and abortions, and the wide-spread abandonment and/or neglect of baby girls. As the policy has recently been extended through new legislation as the nation's demographic strategy in the future (Xin Hua News Agency 2001), we will highlight some of the major challenges confronting Chinese families in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the consequence of this policy. Social policies and programs often work differently from their proposed goals and implementation. An over-determined view of policy shifts may attribute all changed behavior and outcomes directly to policy and program inputs. A multiple set of variables and relationships may be needed to explain and account for both those outcomes that were anticipated and those that were not as expected. This review attempts to unbundle these concepts to suggest implications for policies and programs in future.

### The Development and Implementation of One Child Policy

The origin of one child policy can be traced to the 1950s when the idea of birth control was introduced by a group of nonparty intellectuals. Professor Yinchu Ma (1957) prepared his famous book, *New Population Theory* in response to the unchecked population growth resulting from the improvement of maternal and child health, the fall of mortality rates, and a Maoist government's ambivalent, but generally positive outlook on childbearing (Singer 1998; Greenhalgh 2003) during the early years of the new republic (White 1994). In mean time, Chinese leaders began to see the rapid population growth as a potential threat to the nation's economic development and food surplus (White 1994; 2006).

At the end of the 50s, the party choose to "propagandize and popularize" birth control in all densely populated areas, and "promote childbirth according to plan", which was followed in the 60s by a propaganda campaign promoting late marriage and a two-child family under the slogan of "one is a good few, two is just enough, and three is over" (White 1994; 2006). The

implementation of birth control policy was gradually transferred from a voluntary-based birth planning program to a state-based control of population growth. Such political movements as the Anti-rightist, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution, displaced these birth control efforts until the 70s when the nation's population rose to some 250 million additional people (Ching and Penny 1999). Two steps were taken promoting in population control. The first step began with a "later, longer, fewer" campaign in the 1970, focusing on extending contraceptive and abortion services into the rural areas, and on extensive promotion of later marriage, longer intervals between births, and smaller families. After five years the urban fertility rate fell to below 1.8% and below 4% for rural in 1975. Given that about half of the Chinese population was under the age of 21, further growth was inevitable even if each family was quite small (Festini and de Martino 2004; Hesketh Lu and Xing 2005). By the 1982 census, Chinese population climbed over 1 billion, and if the rapid growing trend persisted, there would be more than 1.4 billion people in China by the end of the century, which would threaten China's ambitious goals of modernization. The one child policy emerged in 1979 and was officially announced by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council's Resolution Concerning the Strengthening of Birth Control and Strictly Controlling Population Growth (1980):

The State advocates the one couple has only one child. Except for special cases, with approval for second birth, government officials, workers and urban residents can only have one child for each couple. In rural areas, the State also advocates that each couple has only one child. However, with approval, those who have real difficulties can have their second child, several years after the birth of the first. (p. 1)

The official goals in the 80's were to reach zero growth and to keep the population at around 1.2 billion by the year 2000 (Hao 1988). People were encouraged to have only one child through financial and material incentives, such as paid pregnancy leave for up to three years, a 5-10 percent salary increase, and preferential access to housing, schools, and health services (Richards 1996; Ching and Penny 1999). Couples having a second child were excluded from these benefits and suffered penalties such as financial levies on each additional child and sanctions, which ranged from social pressure to curtailed career prospects in government jobs. Specific measures and implementation procedures varied from province to province Feng and

Hao 1992) and from time to time over the implementation process. Variation was not simply an urban-rural one or a Han versus minority phenomena (Short and Feigyng 1998).

The policy caught the attention of the world coming, as it did upon the heels of a strong debate in the western world on whether it was indeed possible to change the expected population explosion in much of the developing world. Many scholars and policy makers at that time suggested that the population problem was not amenable to ordinary interventions and education. The Chinese government's decision to mandate change and support the limitation of the one-child family with both incentives for complying and disincentives for non-compliance was coherent with what was being said by some international demographers and politicians. The view that population pressure was a likely crisis especially in Asia was widely held as a major fear for the future of world development and quality of life (Davis 1949: 602; Ehrlich 1968). PRC population science, which was first a social science program, was significantly affected by a natural science and systems engineering group that had "access to Western science, data, computers and political connections" (Greenhalgh 2003: 169). Visiting Europe in 1978, Song Jian, a leader in the group, was exposed to the work inspired by the Club of Rome, which featured both the concept of population explosion and applications of control theory to dealing with the crisis (Greenhalgh 2003: 170). UNFPA, IPPF and World Bank all supported efforts in China and an opportunity was identified for using the Chinese program as a model (Mosher 2006).

While the one child policy was stated as a voluntary-based birth-control program, it was implemented through a grass-root political mobilization and a set of strict administrative controls such as residential registration, certificate of birth approval, and birth certification (White 2006). Coercion in terms of sterilization, forced abortion, and sanctions in terms of housing and economics have been used and provided a major leverage for world criticism of the policy (Mosher 2006). The officials charged with implementing the policies were subject to punishments and rewards themselves. In general, urban couples were easier to persuade and control, because most of them worked in state owned enterprises where the political control and administrative forces were strong. Only under few exceptions, may urban residents have a second birth. In Zhejiang province a couple could have a second child if 1) the first child is a girl or has a defect, 2) one remarried partner had no child by the previous marriage, 3) they belonged

to certain group of workers such as miners, or 4) both partners were themselves from one child families (Hesketh and Zhu 1997; Short and Fengying 1998).

Rural families were more difficult to convince. Peasants, with limited savings and without government pensions, still needed children to support them in old age. As married daughters traditionally moved into their husbands' families' homes and lineage, a son was essential, and preferably more than one, for meeting the demands of labor on farms and related businesses. The stronger resistance from peasants included such strategies as evasion, collusion, cover-up, confrontation and violence (White 2006). In China's vast rural areas where the local social control was weakened by the collapse of the old commune system due to the post-Mao economic reform, local authorities were forced to rely on fines to discourage higher order births. They turned to stringent birth control campaigns, which in the policy's earlier years resulted in many women being bullied into abortions and sterilization. Village level family planning workers were caught between the state's demands and the determination of their friends and neighbors. Gradually villagers developed a process of negotiation and compromise (Greenhalgh 1992), which allowed a degree of flexibility within the policy. Through the combination of reward, persuasion, intimidation, and coercion more than 25 million people were sterilized and the number of abortions and IUD insertions increased, resulting in a remarkable fall of birthrates from 21.1% in 1981 to 17.5% in 1984 (White 2006: 73). Since 1985, softening of policy and relaxing of requirements for second birth has occurred, although details of regulations varied from province to province. By 2001, a large majority of provinces relaxed the conditions for a second birth, if 1) the first child was a girl in rural areas (19 provinces), 2) the couple were only children (27 provinces), and 3) the only child was disabled (31 provinces) (Xin Hua News Agency 2001).

The one child policy has been implemented mainly among Han, the largest nationality in the PRC. The 56 ethnic groups including Tibetan, inner Mongolian, Yi, Pumi, and Lusu, which are some 160 million people spread over a vast area of the PRC, were excluded from the policy to avoid the danger of the group dying out and to reduce conflict with these minorities (People's Daily Online 2008). In an analysis of the Korean minority's participation the one child certificate program, Park and Han (1990) found that the acceptance of the certificate was low in comparison to the Hans, although their actual fertility rate was also low. The Koreans' higher educational

level and participation in professional and technical occupations may have influenced choosing a small family.

The successes of one child policy should not be underestimated. It slowed down the population growth from 11.6% in 1979 to 5.9% in 2005 in PRC and reduced the population by an estimated 250-300 million. The total fertility rate fell from 2.8 in 1979 to 1.8 in 2001 well below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman (Festini and de Martino 2007). In the national level, the one-birth rate rose from 20.7% in 1970, to 72.4% in 2003 (White 2006: 74). Over 95% of preschool children in urban areas, such as Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, were only children (Rosenberg and Jing 1996). These reductions in fertility have eased some of the pressures on communities, the state, and the environment in a country that still carries one fifth of the world's population.

Meanwhile, the large population base and annual net increase remained a tremendous pressure upon China's economic development, resources and environment. The 2000 census reported a total population of 1.267 billion, and the number climbed to 1.285 billion in 2002 (NBSC 2006). As Peng Peiyun, Minister of the State Family Planning, stated, "China must adopt the strategy of sustainable development, promote further its family planning program and provide quality reproductive health service to the eligible couples" (Peng 1997: 926). To emphasize the long-term stability of this policy, China published in its first *Population and Family Planning Law* in 2002, setting birth control as "fundamental State policy", and providing national standards and regulations for its operations (The Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress 2001). The new law formally bans the attachment of subsistence income, use of physical force or confiscation property in pursuit of population goals. Instead, it replaces the earlier fines for out-of-plan births with a "social compensation fee", ranging widely from 10 percent of annual income in some poor rural areas, to three to seven times income in other largely urban areas (UNFPA 2003).

### The Social Consequences of One Child Policy

Several unintended consequences of the one child policy have had an impact on the social and economic situation in China and in the family processes and dynamics. Among the immediate consequences of the policy are: the unbalanced sex ratios and urban-rural ratios of newborns, the changing of family and kinship structure, and the speeding up of population aging,

There are also significant impacts on the format and stability of marriages, the norms of family and intergenerational relationships, and the socialization of the only child.

*The Unbalanced Sex Ratios and Urban-Rural Ratio*

The main international criticism about one-child policy is its consequence of promoting discrimination against female newborns, who may be aborted, abandoned, or unregistered, and who are most likely in disadvantaged status of health care and education. Over the 20 years' implementation of the one child policy, the sex ratio of newborn boys to girls had risen from 108.5 in 1985 to 119 in 2005 (BBC 2006). Sex ratios, higher than 125, were found in 99 cities (BBC 2006). A recent national representative survey suggests the ratio reached 123 in the period of 1996-2001 (Ding and Hesketh 2006). The male bias was stronger for second and third-or-higher order births with 121 and 127 in 1990 and an increase to 152 and 160 by 2000 (China Population Research Center 2002).

Three factors including sex-selected abortion, female infanticide and abandonment, and unreported female birth were responsible for China's unbalanced sex ratios (White 2006). The easy access in China in the 1980s to the ultrasound technology for fetal sex identification made it easier to guarantee the birth of a son. Many children with disabilities were diagnosed through ultrasound exams and modern techniques (Shao and Herbig 1994), and eventually aborted. Over 16,000 abandoned children were brought to civil affair departments in Hunan province between 1986 and 1990 (Johnson 1996). While figures on abandonment are lacking at the national level some estimates suggest perhaps 4.5% of babies, mostly female, are abandoned (Yat-ming 1998). In 2000, Hudson and den Boer reported that there is estimated to be 40.6 million missing women in China. About 1/3 of the sex bias may be due to underreporting of female newborns (Cai and Lavey 2003). Those unreported girls are usually disadvantaged in access public education and social welfare, however, informal adoption may shelter many of them.

Since the one child policy was implemented with different standards for urban and rural residents, the fertility rates of rural residents were higher than that of urban residents. In the 90s, rural women's fertility rates were around 1.6 to 2.0, while the rates for urban women were 1.1 to 1.2 resulted in zero or negative growth population in some well-developed metropolitans, such as Shanghai (Retherford, Choe and Chen 2004). Because there are great urban-rural differences in

One child policy

economic development levels, unbalanced fertility rates will disadvantage poor rural families and affect the whole society.

### *The Changes on Family and Kinship Structure*

Two areas of family and kinship structure have changed: the emergence of the nuclear family in a looser kinship network and the consideration of adoption as both internationally and domestically feasible.

#### *Nuclear and extended family.*

The real and historic situations in the PRC were always different from images held by outsiders. Large extended families have never been the major family pattern in China, although the patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal and familistic values of Confucian ideals were for centuries characteristic of Chinese life and values (Deutsch 2006). Stem families were still common in the 80's, but were influenced by limited housing options (Pimental and Liu 2004). In 1982, nuclear family (66.4%) and extended family (with three generations) (24.3%) were the major forms of urban families in the PRC (Liu, B. 1987). Twelve years later in Beijing, the proportion of nuclear families was roughly the same (65.4%), compared to that of 1982. The percentage of extended families declined from 24.3% in 1982 to 18.0% in 1994, and a family form called "other families", which includes such families as single parent families, divorced families, cohabitating families, increased from 4.56% in 1982 to 14.5% in 1994 (Ma, Wang, Sheng and Shinozaki, 1994). The emergence of this group of families may represent a signal of increasing diversity of the PRC's family structure.

#### *Adoption.*

The one-child policy included discouraging adoption by regulations on whom and in what circumstances one may adopt. The 1992 law required persons adopting to have no children, be able to support the child and be at least 35 years old. In 1999 the age was dropped to 30. Regulations were eased on children who were orphaned by death, who were in the care of social service agencies or had special needs. Officially registered adoptions increased from 2,900 in 1992 to 55,000 in 2001. Many more informal adoptions occur in rural areas and now they are more common everywhere. While adoption is not so frequent in China as in the developed world it is less stigmatized than previously.

The pressure from outside agencies and governments to allow international adoption of Chinese children in institutional care has been intense. China has been the number one source of foreign-born children adopted by Americans averaging 3500 children a year with mostly girls and some handicapped boys predominately from southeast PRC being adopted (Tessler, Gamache and Liu 1999). The State Department granted 6,493 visas to Chinese orphans in 2006 (Belluck and Yardley 2006). The total number of international adoptions is small, but it is highly symbolic for both PRC and the United States. While American media feature stories of horrific conditions in overcrowded Chinese orphanages, Chinese scholars and bureaucrats worry about how well the adopted children are treated in the USA (Tessler, Gamache and Liu 1999: 139-144). Americans have found the relative efficiency of Chinese adoption allows new options for Americans frustrated in the adoption process in the USA (Bouman 2000).

Within China there are regional traditions and adoption norms. Zhang (2001) reports on one north China village where families adopted girls to achieve family goals of help and care in the present and future. Some sham adoptions were used to hide girls against family planning enforcement. Many couples with children adopt and are increasingly willing to adopt girls (Zhang 2006). The lowering of the parents' age requirement and the inclusion of children who were abandoned to be eligible for adoption in 1998 may have promoted formal adoption. Families often prefer to have both a boy and a girl in rural settings and use adoption to meet this goal. In this qualitative study, of the 282 adoptions of girls only 12% would have preferred a boy. Adoption practices in local communities are fairly secret as couples are unwilling to be seen as infertile or unable to produce a son. Some families adopt when a child is abandoned on their front step, but kin and intermediaries are most frequent sources. Usually kin do not exchange money, but gifts or celebrations may be costly. "Rural families make decisions following their own perceived interests rather than State directives. Moreover, people do not respond to policies on paper, but to how the policies are implemented in practice" (Zhang 2006: 333). The outcomes of in-country adoptions are beginning to be studied in China and in an analysis of nutritional status and physical well-being of adopted children were found to have similar outcomes to biological children (Liu, Wyshak and Larsen 2004). Girls appear to be as well treated as boys. However, fewer were in school and had immunizations, perhaps because of formal regulations. Adoption is one of the potential structures for more flexible population programs and for

protection of girls and handicapped children against the harsh reactions of couples and families to the one child policy.

*The Acceleration of Population Aging*

Population aging has been a global phenomenon in modern societies as the result of improvement in nutrition, health and medication, and the extension of life expectancy. The increased aging of China's population is a product of the implementation of one child policy. Before the policy Chinese population was mostly youthful with those 65 years old or older being 4.4% in 1953, 3.6% in 1964) (NBSC 2003: 99). The proportion of population aged 0-14 dropped from 40.7% in 1964 to 19.5% in 2005. Accordingly, the proportion of 65 years old or older increased from 4.9% in 1982 to 9.1% in 2005 (NBSC 2006). It took France 40 years, Sweden 42 years, and Great Britain 61 years to complete this process (Tian, Sha and Yang 1991), while China has only spent about two-and-half decades for the transition. The proportion of elderly is expected to grow to 13.2% and to 22.7% by 2025 and 2050, respectively (United Nations 2001).

The rapid population aging process has profound effects on Chinese society. China's old people's dependency ratio has increased from 6.4% in 1964, to 12.7% in 2005 (NBSC 2006). Many families are structured as 4-2-1 since the first generation of only children has reached their age of marriage. Therefore, a young married couple has to take care of four parents without help from siblings. If the one child policy persists, the care burden of second generation of only-child couples would be doubled or even tripled and the pool of family support of aged parents would shrink. Only 17% of Chinese elders currently have some form of pension and more than 70% rely only on the support of their children (Festini and de Martino 2007). Parents of only children have earlier empty-nest periods of about 5-10 years, and longer lives, requiring policies and programs for adulthood development and education (Zhao 2006). The long term consequences of population aging and smaller families (which do not have the lateral kin or siblings of former years) are to increase the burden and responsibility of caregiving on the single adult child and his or her spouse. Later, when the adult child has health or aging problems of his or her own, services and support from the larger society will be required. The closeness that a young woman has with their own parents and grandparents, due to their sponsorship of her in education and achievement, will be a challenge to the traditional expectations of her role with her in-laws.

*The Formation and Dissolution of Marriages*

Strengthened by Confucianism ideology and administrative measures, the Chinese institution of marriage has had a stable structure, evidenced by very low divorce rates. Before 1979 China divorce rates were below 5 divorces per 100 marriages. Since 1980s, China's divorce rates have increased from 5% in 1979 to 15.3% in 2001 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of China 2002). The one child policy has had some influence on divorce rates in combination with other social changes (Sheng 2005). Having only one child released young couples from additional child bearing and rearing burdens, and allowed them to devote more time and energy pursuing their careers and avocations. Consequently, the bonds of marriage are loosening. When there is a conflict of interests between wives and husbands, divorce is more likely to become the solution. In the current prosperous economic situation, couples may feel free to go their own ways because they can support themselves.

Studies about their marriages and divorces have just begun to emerge. The trend toward increased marriage instability seems more important among the first generation of only children families. In a recent survey on marriages of first generation only children couples who are only children (in contrast to not only child couples) are more likely to be open-minded to pre-marriage and/or out of wedlock sexual behaviors (72% vs. 62%), more likely to rely on their parents for wedding expenses (18% vs. 10%) and childcare (45.7% vs. 28.1%), and more likely to co-reside with their parents after marriage (50.5% vs. 42.5%) (Dajiyuan 2004). Co-residency with parents can help the younger generation, but may cause many conflicts. A recent study of 162 married couples aged under 30 years old revealed that about 87% of only children felt pressured to find a spouse to satisfy their parents, 58% acknowledged their parents were a factor in the break-up, and 55% said that their parents interfered with their marriages (Xinhua 2006). Divorce rates vary by the adult child's status with rates of 24.5% when both were only children, 8.4% when one was an only-child and 11.7% for those from families with more than one child (Xinhua 2006).

There are potential marriage barriers for men due to this imbalanced sex ratio. Estimates, based upon the 2000 census data, suggest that by 2020, there will be 112.8 million men aged 25-35 years old. In contrast, the number of their best matching cohort of women aged 20-30 years old will be 72.1 million, creating a ratio of 3 men to every 2 eligible women (Boxun 2005). The

shortage of brides may not just impact individuals and families (Tuljapurkar, Li and Feldman 1995), but also may threaten China's stability in the future (Hudson and den Boer 2002).

Second marriages may be more prevalent in future. Second marriages challenge the one child policy when one partner has already been a parent and the other has not. With the unbalanced sex ratio women may have opportunities for remarriage that were not possible in either the traditional or revolutionary Chinese culture.

### *Changing Norms of Family and Intergenerational Relationships*

Family norms such as fertility and child preferences, living arrangements, and care of the aged are changing markedly. These trends suggest some insights about Chinese families and intergenerational relationships in future.

#### *Fertility and child preferences.*

Traditionally, an ideal Chinese family consisted of as many generations of the male line and as many male siblings as possible (Chi 1989). According to Confucianism, the worst among three grave failures in filial responsibility is to fail to have a son (Hillier 1988). In contrast, by 1982, when the strict policy was in place, a family survey in Beijing reported that among 773 married women, 55% of them preferred to have one child, while 37% of them preferred to have two (Zheng and Me 1987). Twenty years later, Li (2003) in Beijing reported an increase on zero or one child. The majority of the samples had no particular gender preference on children (63.1%). Feng (2004) reported similar data. A survey of only children aged 20-30 years old in Shanghai revealed about half of the respondents wished to have two children, and mean desirable number of children was 1.46 (Gong 2006). More than  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the respondents said that it doesn't matter about having a son or a daughter. With equal education and more open employment opportunities, the traditional reasons for male preference are no longer as applicable in big cities like Shanghai where in 2000 there was a normal sex ratio of 106 boys to 100 girls (Nie and Wyman 2005). This shift towards accepting a norm of one or two children, and having less of a gender preference is a major difference from Confucian ideology.

New ideas about the purposes of child rearing are associated with this change. Rearing children for aged security and for succession of a patriarchal line, was another important traditional belief of Chinese people (Ning, Ning and Ning, 1995). The one child policy has

created a new reality with a couple having only one child for later life support and care, and questioning the traditional norms of child rearing. In Beijing only 11.8% and 5.6% of the respondents reported that their “purpose of having children” was for aged support or for succession of patriarchal line respectively (Ma et al. 1994). Instead, 27% of the respondents agreed that the purpose of having children was for affective satisfaction, 23.4% for realization of unfulfilled of ideals, and 20.8% simply said that it is natural to have a child.

*Living arrangements.*

Chinese cultural norms favored large, multi-generation families where elders are supported and youngsters are cared for under the same roof. According to 2000 census data, about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of elders lived with their children (NBSC 2001). In 1988, a national wide survey of people over 60 years old reported that 44.8% of the respondents supported the idea of “living together with at least one married child”, 35.1% of them preferred to “live close but not necessarily together”, and only 4.8 % of them would like to “live separately with children”, although 41% of them were actually living with their adult children when the survey was conducted (Hu and Ye 1991). Six years later, Ma et al. (1994) found in Beijing that the proportion of favoring to live together with adult children fell to 24.5%, and those preferred to live separately increased from 4.8% in 1988 to 14.5%, while the percentage of people preferred to “live close but not necessarily together” remained to be roughly the same as that of the 1988 survey (32.3%). A sample of 1,786 young workers in 12 Chinese cities reported that about  $\frac{2}{3}$  of only child couples were living separately from their parents, and those living with husbands’ and wives’ parents were evenly divided (Feng 2006). Living separately is expected to increase as the first generation of only children gets married. One-fifth of couples in an urban study by Pimental and Liu (2004) experienced co-residence for significant time with the wife’s parent(s) suggesting that residence patterns now include the wife’s family ties as well. Increasing independence and increased availability of housing has also been a force in changed separate living arrangements (Deutsch 2006). Young people often do not want to co-reside with their parents even when they live in the same city. In some areas in rural China the practice of uxorilocal marriage in which the daughter remains in her own family and the man is brought into that family had been viewed as an inferior marriage form, but may be less so in terms of the one child family (Han 2003). Even in rural areas most parents are seeing independent residence as more popular and appropriate (Han 2003). The demand for alternative living arrangements for elder generations

and more institutional care is likely to increase especially as both mobility and opportunity are more available.

*Elder care.*

Filial support to parents is not only one of China's traditional merits, but also the indispensable part of intergenerational exchanges which happen over the family developmental cycle (Ning et al. 1995). Parental support has been more than a moral obligation; it was an economic obligation that balanced the older generations for investments and transfers of resources to children. While the norm of filial piety is still very strong, people may be forced to reconsider its practicality and feasibility. The family consciousness survey revealed that the younger generation (20-40 years old) tend to have higher expectations for institutional care (23.6%) than the elder generations over 60 years old (11.3% institutional care). Similarly, the expectations for being cared by children were in the opposite direction for the younger generations (10%) and for the elder generations (37%) (Ma et al. 1994).

The family remains the main support of its older members, particularly in rural areas. The lack of comprehensive pensions, except for government and large companies, means that nearly 70 % of elderly people depend on their children's financial help (Hesketh et al. 2005). Since many rural Chinese do not have any pension and follow the practice of village exogamy, the birth of sons remains an important feature of security (Ikels 1990). In the rural areas, reform has caused a surplus of workers, as farming has become more efficient and migration to urban areas has followed, leaving many elderly alone (Goldstein, White and Goldstein 1997).

Although elder care has been viewed as the responsibility of the son, the actual care was mostly given by the daughter-in-law. When the only child is a girl, her parents have no one else to care for them and are in no hurry to sever their ties with her. The lack of formal services for the elderly and the increasing length of life will cause stress for the single adult child who is no longer young and may be responsible for a large group of frail elderly (Ikels 1990). Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) emphasize that the steady expansion of life expectancy worldwide has not reached a ceiling and that both the old and the old-old sectors of the demographic profile will have much greater demands for pension, health-care and social needs than planners are expecting. Smaller families with many elders will be challenged to make up the shortfall. Daughters now support of their older parents' care, too. In the cities, more and more young

couples live with, or at least close to the wives' parents (Pimental and Liu 2004). In rural areas, many daughters also take the responsibility of supporting the family. Girls may leave their hometown to go to cities, searching for a job, or entering university. Although they may not get a high salary, they still keep a link between them and their parents. Some choose to bring their older parents to the cities and others send money home.

### *Socialization of the only child*

The socialization of the only child in China is nested in the nuclear and extended family, but has many inputs from the schools and communities. Both concerns and high expectations for the children have shaped research questions and data analysis of the period.

#### *Parenting and grand-parenting.*

According to a recent estimate, by 1999, China had had a total of 86-92 million of only children (Yang and Guo 2004). Calculations based on this data predict that the total number of China's only children exceeded 100 million in 2007. As the majority of children today have grown up in one-child families, and have experienced more gender equality and prosperity, concerns about parenting and grand-parenting have been raised (Deutsch 2006). The belief that an only child belongs to both sets of grandparents has become more common.

Anticipating this transition during the 80s, speculations were that the only child cohort would become a spoiled generation characterized as effeminate, sluggish, willful and selfish 'Little Emperor' (Han 1986), because their parents were giving superior human and material resources to them. In 1986, the *Guang Ming Daily*, one of the largest newspapers in China, launched a national-wide discussion on these issues and concluded that the only children would have superior nutrition and health care, overdeveloped intelligence, but be imbalanced on psychological development; and have less attention to moral qualities (Feng 2002).

Parents of only children usually have great expectations and encourage their children's studying for academic achievement because they believe that it is critical for their children's success in an increasingly competitive world (Man 1993). According to a Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences survey (Zhu 1992), 55% of the parents considered the good school achievement of their only children as the happiest moment of their families, and more than half of the parents say they would punish if the child failed an exam. Parents of only children devoted more time

than parents of children with siblings to work with their children on their studies. In Beijing, Chen (1986) found that 76% of the mothers and 51% of the fathers, of only children, spent more than half of their leisure time with their children, while only 60% of mothers and 45% of fathers of children with sibling(s) did so. About 20% of mothers and 10% of fathers of only children reported that they spent almost all of their leisure time with their children, while only 7.2% of the mothers and 4.8% of the fathers of children with sibling(s) did so. Feng (1993) interviewed 1293 pupils in Hubei province, and found that 74% of the fathers and 83.4% of the mothers of only children often played with their children, while 55.9% of fathers and 61.3% of mothers of children with siblings did so. In addition to regular school curriculum, about 80% of pupils take extra training classes during weekends including math, writing, computer, music, English, dancing, and arts. In a study of schoolchildren in the Changchun metropolitan area, they found only children performing better in mathematics and language tests, especially in the urban areas, and they were rated higher by their teachers in positive personality variables (Poston and Falbo 1990a). The competition to get into “key point” schools requires an early focus on achievement and often families are spending 15% of income on educational expenses and many are willing to borrow for college education which is no longer entirely free (Fong 2002). Girls are often enrolled in music as well as other tutorials, “...urban singleton daughters enjoy unprecedented support for their effort to challenge norms that work against them while utilizing those that work in their favor” (Fong 2002: 1105). Of course, not everyone will be able to use education as a way forward and some disappointment and frustration is likely to result from the high level of effort to get into college and limits on job and mobility outcomes. “Children bear the burden of these expectations and the possibility of a leisurely childhood is largely sacrificed to studying” (Nie and Wyman 2005: 330).

Some of the parenting difficulties reported in the child rearing literature may stem from parents desires to instill values which may be inconsistent or difficult to apply to everyday experiences. Fong (2007) reported on her extensive studies of parenting in Dalian, China and provided some in-depth case studies to illustrate how challenging it is for parents to teach even such well agreed upon values as obedience, caring/sociableness, independence and excellence with ordinary children and youth. The gap between the complexity of the social value and the application was not bridged easily. Parents were often disappointed when young people’s

behavioral choices seemed to lack one or another value while meeting another precept too literally. Some of these conflicts stem from other social and economic changes that have accompanied the demographic change and not just the situation of the singleton child.

Most preschool children in the PRC are in daycare facilities for most of the day where they play with peers and are socialized to share and begin to learn cultural values. Using a combination of data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey and a small in-depth qualitative interview study, Short, Fengying, Siyuan and Mingliang (2001) examined young children's care in the family including grandmothers, fathers and mothers. Joint participation of father and mother in child care was greater when the child had some preschool care in an educational setting. A little over one-fifth of the children received care from grandmothers (Wang 2007). Grandmothers while very involved in care tended to see their role as less critical than the parents and therefore less responsible overall. Grandparents are an important source of caregiving in China, especially when their grandchildren are young and/or the parents are not available due to employment or migration. Co-residence and nearby residence may provide access for children's care especially of the child under three. While mothers are relieved of some of the child care role and see grandparents as more dependable than domestic helpers and children often gain in social skills, there are conflicts between the generations in caregiving approaches with grandparents having different preferences and sending double messages to children and grandparents being exhausted by the young child's needs (Goh 2006). According to recent surveys, about 76.5% of Shanghai children aged 0-3 were residing with, and 88.9% of them were directly cared for by their grandparents (Honggen 2007), and the rates of grandparent caregiving for Tian Jin was 85.6% (Liu 2007). The rates of grandparent involvement fall as the children go to preschools. In a nationwide survey, about 70% of children aged 0-6, were cared for and educated by their grandparents in Beijing, in Shanghai 60% and in Guanzhou 50% (Wenhui Daily 2005). Grandparents' proximity to provide childcare reduced childcare load for young couples, especially the mothers (Chen, Short and Entwisle 2000). Grandparent care raised concerns about the quality of early socialization of children, because children with grandparents may be more likely to be spoiled and indulged (Guan, 2000).

Parents did not report differences that characterized singles differently from those with siblings in personality and virtues. Girls and children whose parents were educated and had high expectations did better scholastically. Davin (1989) suggested that the increased attention and

resources devoted to childbearing may ultimately have quite beneficial effects on only children's development.

### *Child development*

Research in child development has been intensive and has become more refined as children could be followed from infancy to young adulthood. While the child development literature usually handles family as a background variable, in this paper we connect the studies directly to the issues of the one child family as this is the major concern in these studies: whether children are being socialized appropriately at home and in school. Early studies collecting data from kindergarten and elementary school children, reported that only children displayed several undesirable personality traits. They were more egocentric and weaker in persistence at a task, behavioral control, and tension-binding qualities or inhibition. (Jiao, Ji and Ring 1986). Later some studies showed marked food preferences, short attention span, obstinacy, and demand for immediate gratification (Wan, Fan, Lin and Jing 1994), and were weaker on some traits of individual initiative (Huang, 1992) and the abilities of self-care (Yang et al. 2003). Li and Liu (1989) found that only children's personality difficulties are more serious than non-only children, although their intellectual achievement is higher than children with siblings. Chen (1986) found lower affiliation in suburban boys who were only children, but not for girls. Other researchers found either no significant differences between only children and non-only children on their personality development or only children were better on certain personality traits (Poston and Falbo 1990b; Gao 1992; Wan, Fan and Lin 1994; Liu 1988, Tao, Qiu, Li, Zeng and Xu 1996; Tao, Qiu, Li, Zeng, Xu and Goebert 1999; Yang, Ollendick, Dong, Xia and Lin 1995).

During the period of middle and high school any personality differences between only children and children with siblings seemed smaller, and in some aspects only children even did better than did children with siblings. Using standard Y-G personality scale, He (1997) reported no significant differences on most personal trait items for high school students. Collecting data from middle schools in Chinese cities in 1996 and 1998, in contrast to the "Little Emperor's" hypothesis, Feng (2000) found that only children were more advanced in their social abilities than children with siblings. They were more likely to have new friends, more easy-going, and less likely to be alone.

New studies on college students who are only children revealed that they were more advanced than children with siblings in major personality traits (Feng 2002). In four universities in Guangzhou, Jing (1997) found that only children were more advanced than non-only children in sociability, competition, and cognitive self-estimation, but weaker than non-only children in taking care of themselves. Duan (1997) concluded that the psychological characteristics and health were significantly better than that of non-only children in their study. Applying SCL-90 (sleep disorder and sleep evaluation) to university freshmen, Dai et al. (2000) found the level of psychological well-being of only children was significantly higher than that of non-only children. Using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, Chen, Wang and Miao (2000) revealed no significant differences between only children and non-only children. In general, female only children appeared more naive and infantile. In contrast, Lu (2002) showed the psychological well-being of only-girl undergraduate students, measured by the University Personality Inventory (UPE), was significantly advanced than that of students with siblings.

Over the past 25 years, more than 200 research studies have been done on only children's academic and personality development in school (Falbo, Poston and Feng 1996). The specific findings of these researches vary widely, and are often contradictory with each other in terms of the measures applied, period of schooling, and regions of residence (Feng 2002). It is now commonly agreed that, compared to children with siblings, only children tended to be more advanced in the development of certain cognitive, emotional, and physical domains. However, arguments focused on the personality development of only children during the period of early childhood still remain to be settled. Long term personality outcomes appear favorable to the only child. Parents and grandparents are highly involved in the rearing of the only child. Overall, the early expectation of achievement or personality difficulties for only children and young adults has not been fulfilled. Only children in China have many of the same advantages in development found in the research on only and first children worldwide. The child development research can be seen as a strong source of positive evaluation of the outcomes of the one child programs and policies and of how families have responded to the new situation.

## Conclusion: Challenges Confronting Chinese Families in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

### *Current Situation*

Retherford, Choe, Chen, Xiru and Hongyan (2005) note that some care must be taken in estimating the actual decrease in fertility, but suggest it was close to 1.0 among urban women and those with high school or college education and in 2000 being closer to 1.5 or 1.6 for all of China. Some signals suggest that China is attempting to soften its one child policy. Among the potential trends are changing policies about IUD'S or sterilization, second pregnancies and fines as an option or if the first child was a girl perhaps eliminating the fine (Bernman 1999). Hesketh and Xing (2000) note a UN sponsored project to abolish population goals and targets in 32 counties in 16 regions in China coupled with enhanced contraceptive choices, which if effective, may suggest a new "small family culture" is evolving. In some large cities such as Shanghai and Beijing, which have already reached or are approaching zero growth of population, more relaxed regulations for implementing the policy have been proposed in recent years; including letting couples who are both only children have two children. According to UN projections, China's population will actually start to decline in 2042 (China's lifestyle choice 2001). Hesketh and Xing (2005) notes that now 800 of 3000 counties are now using a more client centered family planning service approach and that couples no longer need to obtain permission to have a first child or time the pregnancy to meet local quotas.

Some of the implications of the one child policy are already being felt. The focus of more adults in child rearing of fewer children has provided better opportunities and resources for these children. While questions about over-solicitous adults either pressuring the child to perform or encouraging self-centered behavior are still concerns, it is clear that the one child has some of the special advantages of oldest and only children that have been documented in other societies. Rosenberg and Jing (1996) suggest that a new interactive or reciprocating relationship may be the outcome for both family and society. Higher achievement, aspirations for education, greater leadership with peers, and identification with parents' values characterize the PRC's one-child families. Children are receiving more individual attention from both their families and society. The competition among grandparents for nurturing of their grandchildren may actually intensify over what has already been reported. Certainly the woman's parents in a one child family have a major lifetime interest in her and her child which is both new and normatively unstructured.

Several new issues are beginning to surface, which will have larger social and economic ramifications. Competition for educational and career opportunities is likely to be accentuated, not decreased as the Chinese families are much smaller. Changing gender roles will be played out both what obligations to the elderly are seen as currently relevant and who will be involved in caring for the much larger population sector of the elderly and frail elderly. Changing expectations and perceptions of marriage and parenting are already being seen and are likely to be more dramatic in future. Not only do the demographic trends, but also the economic and social opportunity and structural changes provide a changing set of options at the familial level. In addition to exploring these three sets of new trends, we will conclude with some speculations based on research in terms of the possible changing policies on population.

#### *Competition for Educational and Career Opportunities*

Economic conditions in China today are vastly better than those of early post-revolutionary China, especially on the east coast and some large cities in the middle or in western China. The effect of these developments has been to convince couples of the desirability of small families. As more resources become available to consumers, parents have more chances to provide such resources to children. The ratio of grandparents to grandchildren has been favorable for good childcare and in addition, there are relatively good childcare and school institutions in urban areas. The demographic transition has permeated the school system. The only child sector has already climbed above 50 million in the early 90s, accounting for one fourth of Chinese population aged from 0 to 9, according to the 1990 Census data (China Population Statistics Yearbook 1995). By 1995, almost all (95%) of preschool children, more than 90% of kindergarteners and the majority (60%) of university freshmen in urban PRC were from only child families (China Statistical Yearbook 1997). This massive shift has been accompanied by an increased interest and support for academic and career success for each child, and even greater competition for places in the elite and advanced educational institutions. Pressure for high quality schooling will likely be intense. While in the short run many lower division schools have rented out space to small businesses to support education as the numbers of school children fell due to the population policy, it is possible that adults, in addition, will want to see smaller classes and more creative curricular offerings. Both the older generations and their one child cohorts will desire more educational and vocational training options as longer lifetimes require more frequent job shifts and retraining. Not only will there be pressure on the

universities for a greater proportion of students to be admitted, but other post secondary educational institutions to be developed. A smaller overall student body suggests more rather than less higher education.

The challenge to develop responsive options is quite massive in a large nation in which much infrastructure has been centralized. There have been major changes in the infrastructure for education. Higher education has expanded by more than doubling the number of institutions from 598 in 1978 to 1792 in 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2006). Whole new universities have been founded and built from the ground up, often each serving 50,000 or more students. At the same time preschool, primary, and secondary schools (with the exception of vocational schools which have doubled in number) have decreased in number as the population distribution has changed. Even with the large numbers of Chinese students studying abroad (over 300,000 in the past twenty years) and the greatly increased master's and doctoral post graduate level programs in China there may be a shortfall of professors to develop these new educational institutions (Department of Planning Ministry 2003).

There is already more movement within China's regions of young people looking for opportunity and the need for capital both for economic development and human capital development may polarize public opinion on what is fair access. Online and distance education opportunities may put name brand options within the reach of more families. Internet classes had 891,046 new students' enrollment in 2005 with 2,652,679 total enrollments (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2006). A wide variety of subject areas are available and growth in this sector is quite likely. Vocational education and technical training is also growing rapidly with a much broader range of providers than the main educational institutions. Counties, townships, villages and collectives and even some private providers are involved providing practical and adult education.

Studies about only children's career development have begun to emerge, because the first generation of only children is just about to begin their careers. Based on the survey results showing only children had more intention to change jobs, but were less likely to make actual job turnover in comparison to non-only children. Su (1998) concluded that career adaptability of only children was lower than that of non-only children. However, Feng and Wang (2003) argued that, rather than showing lower job adaptability, this finding may actually be evidence of higher

level job adaptability of only children. Based on a survey of 638 urban youth workers in Hubei province, Feng and Wang (2003) found that no significant difference between only children and non-only children in their occupational adaptability, and only children were doing as well as non-only children in their jobs, suggesting that the effect of being only or non-only children on career development was minor. With a rapidly expanding economy and changing career trajectories more attention is given to actively teaching young people about vocational and professional careers and options. Whether one can move in and out of socio-economic processes may be questionable. The Chinese rural economy had major shifts during the period of institutionalization of the one child family with the distribution of land and responsibility from the People's Communes and the beginning of other local industries and businesses with some entrepreneurship (Walder 2002). An increasing role for wage labor in rural household income is being seen. The understanding of the very real differences in urban career paths in China during both historically and in the recent changes had emphasized the role of party over educational credentials especially in administrative positions (Walder, Li and Treiman 2000).

#### *Competition for care and support*

Because the transition to smaller families has been more comprehensive in urban than rural areas, some of the cohort changes will necessarily be more intense in urban situations. Lack of appropriate infrastructure for the institutional care of the aged, coupled with the lack of tradition for daughters' caring for their own parents may put many elderly at risk to limited support and care by their families and the society. Pensions are helpful in supporting aging in place, but are likely to be insufficient for long term care of frail elderly persons. The number of the extremely elderly Chinese is already growing rapidly (Yi and Vaupel 2003). Whether or not an institutional response would make sense in the PRC, depending only on families with only children and a grandchild for care would seem uncertain. The co-location of families that has been somewhat taken for granted in the PRC may be less likely as children receive more specialized training and have opportunities for mobility including international travel and education. "To meet the double demand of work and parental care in the future, more service options are needed to release this tension between work and care ...." (Zhan 2004: 122). Zhan also suggests that compensation may be necessary for either family caregivers, or other service personal. Joseph and Phillips (1999) suggest that there is a wide range of capability in rural communities to provide support to the elderly and that some communities will do much better

than others at providing support of all kinds. Elder care at a distance, which has been so demanding in the United States, may become more common in China. Just as Thanksgiving is a pilgrimage home for families scattered in America, the Chinese New Year points up the amount of migration and return to home that family members try to do. Transportation is strained and stories of family trials in getting together already are part of the culture.

*Changing expectations and perceptions of marriage and parenting*

Families' preferences for a male child may create problems of marriage in this younger generation. First, young women who are well educated and economically well off may be a bit more selective in their choice of marital partner or may not find early marriage or any marriage at all attractive. Their families may also want some assurances that they will not be left out of the caregiving and consideration of their daughters in a marriage. While, no doubt, there will be many less well off women who are seeking marriage, especially in the countryside, young urban men and their families may not find these opportunities suitable. Some changes in norms and customs of marriage may be developed as the reality of sex ratios and probabilities are addressed. Negotiation among families may become more important around marital decisions. At the same time the tight marriage market may allow women more opportunity for love matches and personal choice. More life-long single males will be searching for social support and care. Certainly the indulgence and close relationships that characterize child rearing in China today may change the basis on which expectations for care and attention to an older society may be generated. If love and affection are the basis for ties to ones parents and grandparents care may flow without reference to duty. The reach of social insurance and pensions beyond the urban scene may be necessary to bring a similar shift to rural areas.

Domestic labor division and everyday life are also likely to be subject to revised expectations and outcomes. When women have more employment and options to choose to marry or not, the basis of the patriarchy and even the informal political climate are threatened. Even if there were no marked changes in the spousal allocations of domestic responsibility, smaller families dramatically shorten the period of time when child care and associated housework are the central themes of family life and with greatly lengthened life expectancies, women will have many more options and opportunities to negotiate or renegotiate gender roles and household tasks. Household tasks allocation has been used as a measure of equity in spousal

relations in many studies, but it is not necessarily the key concept in every society, especially if paid help or outside services are available. One pioneering study by Chow and Chen (1994) which compared one child and multiple child families did not find big differences in the pattern of sharing of household work and mothers spent significantly more time in childcare, but not much difference was found in the two types of households. Short et al. (2001), notes that there are differences in what child care tasks fathers did as compared to mothers and grandmothers. Fong (2002) suggests that young women expect that the division of labor will be more egalitarian in their marriages than those of their parents. Improvements in housing and household equipment are both a possible support for egalitarian division of labor and also an invitation to more labor. It is not clear how important the impact of the one child family will be on more egalitarian gender roles within the family but certainly the trend seems to be in that direction.

#### *Changing policy on population*

A final word about whether relaxation of the mandates from the government and in the implementation of family size policy would radically shift trends would suggest that demographic changes are likely to be sustained in general. While one cannot be sure what would have happened under different policy conditions in China, across the globe women who have education, access to contraception and abortion and their own earned income are limiting their families to replacement or below replacement levels. United Nations studies (2001) show the swift adoption of a major demographic transition in developing countries has outpaced predictions. Some of China's neighbors who have the lowest birth rates had substantial declines in fertility in the past twenty five years including Singapore (1.04), Japan (1.38) and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (0.91) (Hesketh, Lu and Xing 2005: 1172). When an underdeveloped country, such as Bangladesh, can make the transition to replacement in a mere twenty years, it shows that our forecasts for the future are dependent on small differences in family decisions made over large sectors of the population (Belsie 2000). It seems likely that Chinese women may not be so different from other women in today's world. The policies and programs of the one child program were never implemented in an "ideal" fashion. The evolution of the one child policy, as reviewed here previously suggests that there is both local/regional and global influences upon the selection, implementation and support for the policies. Certain exceptions were and are made. Some rationales for exceptions are preferable to the general population and are likely to be continued. Some incentive/disincentive schemes were

and are more persuasive to some groups than others. Increasing flexibility and positive rewards are likely changes. Moving away from specific local goals and negative sanctions seems feasible. Opportunities for domestic adoption of children may also increase as policy is fine tuned. Men and women alike have seen opportunities open up for their smaller families and have lavished care on fewer children, to a good effect. Current advantages to small families are even more built into other developing social and economic changes and are supportive in the future of small families. The future of China's families will need to include more formal supports for broad based education, health, old age care, and continued emphasis on the opening of opportunities in rural as well as urban situations.

## References

- BBC 2006. "China Warned On Gender Imbalance." Retrieved August, 14, 2006 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6962650.stm>
- Belluck, P., and J. Yardley 2006. "China Tightens Adoption Rules for Foreigners". New York Times, December 20. Retrieved August 29, 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/us/20adopt.html?ex=1188964800&en=0ff1426794b6d612andei=5070>
- Belsie, L. 2000. "A Thousand Years of World Population". *Journal of Family and Consumer Sciences* 92: 22-24.
- Bernman, J. 1999. "China Attempts to Soften its One Child Policy". *The Lancet*, 353: 567.
- Bouman, R. A. 2000. "China's Attempt to Promote Domestic Adoptions: How Does China's One-Child Policy Affect Recent Revisions in China's Adoption Law and Measure Up to The Hague Convention?" *Transnational Law* 13: 92-132.
- Boxun. 2005 "Zhongguo reko sinweiji [*The New Population Crisis of China*]." Retrieved June 19, 2004 from <http://www.dajiyuan.com/gb/4/6/19/n572939.htm>
- Cai, Y., and W. Lavey 2003. "China's Missing Girls: Numerical Estimates and Effects on Population Growth." *China Review* 3: 13-29.
- Chen, K. 1986. "A Study of Current Only-Child Families In PRC: A Survey of 1180 Families in the Urban and Suburban Areas of Beijing." *ASP Association Paper*, 1986.
- Chen, F., Short, S. E., and B. Entwisle, 2000. "The Impact of Grandparental Proximity on Maternal Childcare in China". *Population Research and Policy Review*, 19: 571-590.
- Chen, X., Wang, J., and F. Miao, F. 2000. "Chenshi daxuesheng dushengzinu he feidushengzinu gexingtezheng bijiao [A Comparison of Personality Between Single-Children and Non-Single Children College Students Born in Cities]." *China Public Health* 4 April: 16
- Chi, P. 1989. "Determine of Family Formation n Taiwan." *Population and Development Program Working Paper Series*. Cornell University: New York, 1-17.
- China Population Research Center 2002. "China Sees a Ratio of Newborns." Retrieved August 1, 2007 from <http://www.cpirc.org.cn/enews20020514.htm>

One child policy

*China Population Statistics Yearbook*. 1995. Beijing: China Statistical Press.

*China Statistical Yearbook*. 1997. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.

China's Lifestyle Choice. 2001. "Changes to the Famous One-Child Policy Miss the Point. Who Will Care for a Graying Population?" *Time*, August 6 158: 32.

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council's Resolution Concerning the strengthening of Birth Control and Strictly Controlling Population Growth. 1980. *People's Daily*. May 20: 1.

Ching, Y. C., and K. Penny. 1999. "PRC's One Child Family Policy". *British Medical Journal* 319: 992.

Chow, E. N., and K. Chen. 1994. "The Impact of the One-Child Policy in Women and the Patriarchal Family in the People's Republic of China." Pp. 71-98 in *Women, The Family and Policy: A Global Perspective*, edited by E. N. Chow and C. W. Berherine. Albany, NY: State University of New York.

Dai, W., S. Feng, L. Yu, S. Zhang, X. Zhang, Q. Peng et al. 2000. "Dusheng yu feidushengziniu de SCL-90 ji EPQ duizhao yanjiu [The Comparison of the Status of Mental Health of the Singleton and Non-Singleton College Students]." *Chinese Mental Health Journal*, 19, 4, 2005, 256-258.

Dajiyuan 2004. "Zhongguo diyi dai dushengzinv hunyin zhuangkuang diaocha [A Survey About The Marital Status of the First Generation of Only Child in China]." Retrieved June 19, 2004 from <http://www.dajiyuan.com/4/6/19/n572939.htm>

Davin, D. 1989. "Adapting to Society of 'Little Emperors'." *People*, 16: 26-28.

Davis, K. 1949. *Human Society*. New York: Macmillan.

Department of Planning Ministry PRC. 2003. *Report of Education Statistics*, February 27: 1.

Deutsch, F. M. 2006. "Filial Piety, Patrilineality and China's One-Child Policy." *Journal of Family Issues* 27: 366-389.

Ding, Q. J., and T. Hesketh. 2006. "Family Size, Fertility Preferences and Sex Ratio in China in the Era of the One Child Family Policy: Results from National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey." *British Medical Journal* 333: 371-373.

- Duan, X. 1997. "Dushengziniu daxuesheng xinlijiankang zhuangkuang de diaocha fenxi [An Analysis in Current Status of Psychological Well-Being of Undergraduate Only Children]." *Youth Studies*, 3, 1997.
- Ehrlich, P. R. 1968. *The Population Bomb*. New York: Ballentine.
- Falbo, T., D. L. Poston, and X. T. Feng, 1996. "The Academic Personality and Physical Outcome of Chinese Only Children: A Review. Pp. 265-288 in *Growing Up the Chinese Way: The Role of Culture in Socialization*, edited by S. Lau. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Feng, G., and, L. Hao 1992. "Quan guo er shi ba ge di fang ji hua sheng yu tiao li zong shu. [A Summary of Family Planning Regulations for 28 Regions in China]." *Population Research*, 4, 28-33.
- Feng, X. 1993. "Bias and Reality: A Survey Analysis of Issues on Only Children's Education." *Sociological Studies*, 1, 90-96.
- , 2000. "Dushengziyu qingshaonian shehuihua guocheng jiqi jieguo [The Process of Socialization of Youth Only Children]." *Chinese Social Sciences* 6.
- , 2002. "Zhongguo duahengziniu yanjiu: huigu yu zhangqian [A Study of China's Only Child: Retrospect and a Prediction]." *Journal of Jianghai* 5.
- , 2004. "Chengshi qingnian de shengyu yiyuan [The Urban Youth's Desire for Giving Birth: The Actualities and a Comparative Analysis]." *Jiangsu Social Sciences* 4.
- , 2006. "Diyidai dushengziniu hunhou juzhufangshi: yixiang 12 chengshi de diaocha fenxi [Living Arrangement After Marriage of the First-Generation Only Children]." *Population Research*, 30.
- Feng, X., and X. Wang. 2003. "Chengshi qingnian de zhiye shiyong: dushengziniu he feidushengziniu de bijiaoyanjiu [The Occupation Adaptability of Urban Youth: A Comparative Study Between Only and Non Only Children]." *Jiangsu Social Sciences*, 4.
- Festini, F., and M. de Martino. 2004. "Twenty Five Years of the One-Child Family Policy in China." *Journal of Epidemial Community Health*, 58, 358-359.

One child policy

- , 2007. "Twenty Five Years of the One Child Family Policy in China." Retrieved June 25, 2007 from <http://jech.bmj.com>
- Fong, V. L. 2002. "China's One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters." *American Anthropologist*, 104: 1098-1109.
- , 2007. "Parent-Child Communication Problems and Perceived Inadequacies of Chinese Only Children." *Ethos*, 35: 85-127.
- Gao, W. 1992. "The Survey Concerning the Health, Study and Life of Only Children." *Journal of Demography* 6: 22-31.
- Goh, E. C. L. 2006. "Raising the Precious Single Child in Urban China: An Intergenerational Joint Mission Between Parents and Grandparents." *Journal of International Relationships*, 4: 7-28.
- Goldstein, A., White, M., and S. Goldstein. 1997. "Migration, Fertility and State Policy in Hubei Province, China." *Demography* 34: 481-491.
- Gong, Y. 2006. "Yanglao yali da, qingnianren shengyuyiyuan pupian tigao" [Young People's Desirable Number of Children Increased Under the Great Pressure of Supporting the Aged]. Retrieved August, 25, 2006 from <http://www.xxz.gov.cn/news/37158.html>
- Greenhalgh S. 1992. *Negotiating Birth Control in Village China*. New York: Population Council.
- , 2003. Science, "Modernity and the Making of China's One Child Policy". *Population and Development Review* 29: 163-196.
- Guan, Y. 2000. "Shehuixue shiyezhong de jiating yiaoyu" [*Family Education: A Sociological Perspective*]. Tianjin: Tianjin Press of Social Sciences.
- Han, H. 2003. "Sexuality and Uxorilocal Marriage in Rural North China: Impacts of the One-Child-One-Family Policy on Gender and Kinship." *Journal of Family History*, 28: 443-459.
- Han, Y, 1986. "The Chinese 'Little Emperor'". *Chinese Writers* 3.
- Hao Y. 1988. China's 1.2 Billion Population Target for the Year 2000: "Within" or "Beyond"? *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 19/20: 165-183.

- He, Y. 1997. "Gaozhongsheng dushengziniu yu feidushengziniu rengetezhi de bijiaoyanjiu" [A Comparative Study of Personality Traits of Only Children and Children with Siblings in High Schools]. *Psychological Development and Education*, 1, 1997.
- Hesketh, T., and Z. W. Xing, 2000. "China's One Child Policy is Changing." *British Medical Journal* 320: 443.
- Hesketh, T., and W. X. Zhu. 1997. "The One Child Family Policy: The Good, the Bad, and Ugly." *British Medical Journal* 314: 1685-1687.
- Hesketh, T., L. Lu, and Z. W. Xing, 2005. "The Effect of China's One-Child Policy After 25 Years." *The New England Journal of Medicine*, 353: 1171-1176.
- Hillier, S. 1988. "Women and Population Control in China: Issues of Sexuality, Power, and Control." *Feminist Review* 29: 101-113.
- Honggen 2007. "Gedaifuyu: feilibutaohao" [Grandparenting: A Tough but Thankless Job] Retrieved July, 20, 2007 from <http://www.531199.com>.
- Hu, R., and N. Ye, Editors. 1991. *The Sampling Survey of Old People in Nine Large Chinese Cities*. Tian Jin: Tian Jin Education Publishing House.
- Huang, L., 1992. "The Survey Analysis of the Influences of Family Factors on Children's Personality Development." *Journal of Demography* 2: 35-47.
- Hudson, V. M., and A. M.den Boer. 2002. "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratio in Asia's Largest States." *Int Secur* 26: 5-38.
- . 2005. "Missing women and bare branches: gender balance and conflict." *ECSP Report* 11: 20-24. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Ikels, C. 1990. "Family Caregivers and the Elderly in China." Pp. 270-284. In *Aging and Caregiving: Theory, research and policy*, edited by D. E. Biegel, and A. Blum. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Jiao, S., Ji, D. and Q. Ring. 1986. "Comparative Study of Behavioral Qualities of Only Children and Sibling Children." *Child Development* 57: 357-361.

- Jing, H. 1997. "Dusheng and feidusheng daxuesheng rougan shehuixinli pinzhi de bijiaoyanjiu" [An Comparative Study Between Only Children and Non-Only Children on Several Social Psychological Traits]. *Journal of Zhongshan University* 6.
- Johnson, K. 1996. "The Politics of the Revival of Infant Abandonment in China, with Special Reference to Hunan". *Population and Developmental Review* 22: 77-99.
- Joseph, A. E., and D. R. Phillips. 1999. "Ageing in Rural China: Impacts of Increasing Diversity in Family and Community Resources." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology* 14: 153-168.
- Li, J. 2003. "Beijingshi dushengziyu shengyu yiyua diaocha" [A Survey on the Fertility Preferences of Only Children in Beijing]. *Chinese Population Sciences* 4: 74-78.
- Li, Y., and H. Liu. 1989. The Recovery and Development of Sociology of Education. *Social Psychology* 1: 56-70.
- Liu, B. 1987. "Current Status and Trends of China's Family Structure." Pp. 113-128 In *The Study of Marriage and Family In China*, edited by Y., Liu. and S. Xiue. Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House.
- 2007. "Gedajjiaoyu: zhongqinggan, qinglizi" [Grandparenting: More Emotional, Than Intellectual]. Retrieved July, 16, 2007 from [http://211.94.198.12/jwb/html/2007-07/16/content\\_59214.htm](http://211.94.198.12/jwb/html/2007-07/16/content_59214.htm).
- Liu, D. 1988. "Dushengziniu yu feidushengziniu bijiao yanjiu diaochabaogao" [A Survey Report on the Comparative Study Between Only Children and Children with Siblings]. *Journal of Demography* 3.
- Liu, J., G. Wyshak, and U. Larsen. 2004. "Physical Well-Being and School Enrollment: A Comparison of Adopted and Biological Children in One-Child Families in China." *Social Science and Medicine* 59: 609-623.
- Liu, Z. 1980. *Population Theory in China*, Translated and edited by H. Y. Tien. New York: Croom Helm.

- Lu, X. 2002. Nudaxuwsheng xinlijiankang zhuangkuang ji xiangguan yinsu yanjiu [A Study and Correlation Analysis of Mental Health of University Girls]. *Heilongjiang Researches on Higher Education* 110: 86-88.
- Ma, Y. 1957, March 20. "Xin renkou lun" [New Population Theory]. In *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily].
- Ma, Y., Z. Wang, X. Sheng, and M. Shinozaki. 1994. "A Study of Life and Consciousness of Contemporary Urban Family in China: A Research in Beijing with Comparison Among Bangkok, Seoul, and Fukuoka." Kitakyushu: Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women.
- Man, G. 1993, April 21. "80% of Pupils go to Sunday School." *Beijing Daily*: 3.
- Ministry of Civil Affairs of China 2002) *China Civil Affairs' Statistical Yearbook 2002*. China Statistics Press.
- Mosher, S. W. 2006, Winter. "China's One-Child Policy: Twenty-Five Years Later." *The Human Life Review*: 76-101.
- National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 2001. *China Statistical Yearbook-2006*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- 2003. *China Statistical Yearbook-2006*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- 2006. *China Statistical Yearbook-2006*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
- Nie, Y. and R. J. Wyler. 2005. "The One Child Policy in Shanghai: Acceptance and Internalization." *Population and Development Review*, 31: 313-336.
- Ning, Y. G., Y. Q. Ning, and Y. L. Ning. 1995. *China's Pious Culture*. Beijing: Central University of Nationality Press.
- Oeppen, J. and J. W. Vaupel. 2002. "Broken Limits to Life Expectancy." *Science* 292: 1029-1031.
- Park, C. B., and J. Han. 1990. "A Minority Group and China's One-Child Policy: The Case of the Koreans." *Studies in Family Planning* 21:61-170.
- People's Daily Online. 2008. "China's Ethnic Minorities." Retrieved April 30, 2008 from [http://english.people.com.cn/data/minorities/ethnic\\_minorities.html](http://english.people.com.cn/data/minorities/ethnic_minorities.html)

- Peng, P. 1997. "China's Population Policy." *Population and Development Review* 23: 926.
- Pimental, E. E., and J. Liu. 2004. "Exploring Nonnormative Coresidence in Urban China: Living With Wives' Parents." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 66: 821-836.
- Poston, D. L., and T. Falbo. 1990a. "Academic Performance and Personality Traits of Chinese Children: 'Onlies' Versus Others." *American Journal of Sociology* 96: 433-451.
- , 1990b. "Scholastic and Personality Characteristics of Only Children and Children with Siblings in China." *International Family Planning Perspectives* 16: 45-48 and 54.
- Retherford, R. D., M. K. Choe, and J. Chen. 2004. "Zhongguo de shengyulu: daodi xiajiang le duoshuo?" [China's fertility rates: How much do they actually decline?]. *Population studies* 4: 2004.
- Retherford, R. D., M. K. Choe, J. Chen, L. Xiru, and Hongyan, C. 2005. "How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?" *Population and Development Review* 31: 57-84.
- Richards, L. 1996. "Controlling China's Baby Boom." *Contemporary Review* 268: 5.
- Rosenberg, B. G., and Q. Jing. 1996. "A Revolution in Family Life: The Political and Social Structural Impact of China's One Child Policy." *Journal of Social Issues* 52: 51-70.
- Shao, A. T., and P. Herbig. 1994. "Marketing Implications of China's 'Little Emperors'." *Review of Business* 16: 16-21.
- Sheng, X. 1992. "Population Aging and the Traditional Pattern of Supporting the Aged." In *The Proceeding of Asia-Pacific Regional Conference on Future of the Family*. Beijing: China Social Science Documentation Publishing House.
- , 2005. "Chinese Families." Pp. 99-128 in *Handbook of World Families*, edited by B. N. Adams and J. Trost. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Short, S. E., and Z. Fengying. 1998. "Looking Locally at China's One Child Policy." *Studies in Family Planning*, 29: 373-387.
- Short, S. E., Z. Fengying, X. Siyuan, and Y. Mingliang, 2001. "China's One-Child Policy and the Care of Children: An Analysis of Qualitative and Quantitative Data." *Social Forces* 79: 913-943.

- Singer, J. L. 1998. Intercountry Adoption Laws: How Can China's One-Child Policy Coincide with the 1993 Hague Convention on Adoption? *Suffolk Transnational Law Review* 22: 283-310.
- Su, S. 1998. "Shanghai dushengziniu shenghui shiying wenti"[Issues on the Social Adaptability of Only Children in Shanghai]. *Academic Quarterly* 5.
- Tao, G., J. Qiu, B. Li, W. Zeng, and J. Xu, 1996. "Dusheng yu feidusheng ertong de xingwei fazhan" [Comparison of Behavior Development Between Only Children and Children with Siblings: Six-Years Follow-Up Study]. *Chinese Mental Health Journal* 10: 1-5.
- Tao, G., J. Qiu, B. Li, W. Zeng, J. Xu, and Goebert, D. 1999. "Dusheng yu feidusheng ertong xinli fazhan de zongxiang fenxi: Nanjing de shinian zhuizong diaocha" [Longitudinal Study of Psychological Development of Single and Non-Single Children: A 10 Years Follow-Up Study in Nanjing]. *Chinese mental health journal* 13: 210-212.
- Tessler, R., G. Gamache, and L. Liu 1999. *West Meets East: Americans Adopt Chinese Children*. Westport, Connecticut: Bergin & Garvey.
- The Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress 2001. "Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China." Retrieved July 21, 2007, from <http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingel=46089>.
- Tian, X., J. Sha, and Y. Yang 1991. "Zhongguo laonian renkou" [China's Aging Population], Beijing: China Economy Press.
- Tuljapurkar, S., N. Li, and M. W. Feldman 1995. "High Sex Ratios in China's Future." *Science* 276: 874-876.
- UNFPA. 2003. "The United Nations Population Fund in China: A Catalyst for Change." Retrieved August 18, 2007 from <http://www.cath4choice.org/topics/international/documents/2003unfpainchina.pdf>
- United Nations. 2001. *World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. Vol.1: Comprehensive Tables*. New York: United Nations.
- Walder, A. G. 2002. "Markets and Income Inequality in Rural China: Political Advantage in an Expanding Economy." *American Sociological Review* 67: 231-253.

- Walder, A. G., B. Li, and D. J. Treiman. 2000. "Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths Into The Urban Chinese Elite, 1949-1996." *American Sociological Review* 65: 191- 209.
- Wan, C., C. Fan, and G. Lin. 1994. "A Comparative Study of Certain Differences in Individuality and Sex-Based Differences Between 5- And 7-Years Old Only Children and Non Only Children." *Acta Psychological Sinica* 16: 383-391.
- Wan, C., C. Fan, G., Lin, and Q. Jing. 1994. "Comparison of Personality Traits of Only Children and Sibling School Children in Beijing." *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 155: 377-388.
- Wang, H. 2007. "Dangdai zhongguo jiating jiegou zhuanbian yu jiajiao dingwei." [Transition of Family Structure and Parenting Orientation in Contemporary Chinese Society]. Retrieved May3, 2008, from <http://www.jiaj.org/?viewnews-11494.html>.
- Wenhui Daily. 2005. "Shou gedaifuyu ertong qunti shuliang da, jiao yu ruhe yangchangbiduan?" [Large Number of Kids Cared by Grandparents: How Should We Maximize Favorable and Minimize Unfavorable Educational Outcomes?]. Retrieved July 16, 2007, from <http://www.china.com.cn>.
- White, T. 1994. "The Origins of China's Birth Planning Policy." Pp. 250-278 in *Engendering China* edited by C. K. Gilmartin, G. Herstattter, L. Rofel, and T. White . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- White, T. 2006. *China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005*. Cornell University Press.
- Xin Hua News Agency 2001. "Renkou he jihua shengye fa caoan qiangdiao wending xianxing shengye zhence" [The Bill of Population and Birth Planning Emphasizes the Stability of Current Policy]. Retrieved July 21, 2007, from <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/renkou/91445.htm>
- Xinhua, 2006. "Only Children at Risk of Divorce." Retrieved August 18, 2007 from [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/07/content\\_752667.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/07/content_752667.htm).
- Yang, B., T., H. Ollendick, Q. Dong, Y Xia, and L. Lin. 1995. "Only Children and Children Without Siblings in the People's Republic of China: Levels of Fear, Anxiety and Depression". *Child Development* 66: 1301-1311.

- Yang, S., and Z. Guo, 2004. "Zhongguo dushengziniu de xianzhuang jiqidui weilai renkou fazhan de yingxiang" [Current Status of China's Only Children and Its Impacts on Future Population Growth]. Retrieved August, 25, 2006 from [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rklt/rkyjhsyy/t20040326\\_1498.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rklt/rkyjhsyy/t20040326_1498.htm)
- Yang, S., J. Tang, D. Wu, W. Liu, X. Xu, and Zhou, X. 2003. "Dushengziniu yu feidushengziniu de shehui shenghuo nengli pipei bijiao" [A Comparison of Social Capability Between Single and Non-Single Children]. *Journal of Applied Pediatrics*, 18: 992-993.
- Yat-ming, S. 1998. "The Imbalance of Sexes in China: A Consequence of the "One-Child" Policy?" Pp. 525-557 in *China in the Post-Deng Era*, edited J. Y. S. Cheng. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Yi, Z., and J. W. Vaupel. 2003,. "Oldest Old Mortality in China". *Demographic Research*, 18 April 8: Retrieved 29 August, 2007 from <http://www.demographic-research.org>
- Zhan, H. J. 2004. "Socialization or Social Structure: Investigating Predictors of Attitudes Toward Filial Responsibility Among Chinese Urban Youth From One and Multiple Child Families." *International Journal of Aging and Human Development*, 59: 105-124.
- Zhang, W. 2001. "Institutional Reforms, Population Policy, and Adoption Of Children: Some Observations in a North China Village." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, XXXII: 303-318.
- Zhang, W. 2006. "Child Adoption in Contemporary Rural China." *Journal of Family Issues*, 27: 301-340.
- Zhao, L. 2006. Woguo chengshi diyidai dushengziyu fumu de shengming li cheng: cong zhongnian kongchao jiating de chuxian tanqi [The Life Course of Parents of First Generation Only Children in Urban China: A Discussion About Empty-Nest Families of Middle-Adulthood]. *Youth Studies* 6.
- Zheng, C and Me, X. 1987. "Changes on Number of Children and Family Patterns." Pp. 193-207 in *Studies of Marriage and Family in China* edited by Y. Liu and S. Xue. Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House.
- Zhu, G. 1992. Forcing And Spoiling: The Natural Enemies Of Child Education. *Chinese Women's Daily*, December, 16: 4.