



Master Thesis

**To what extent do development strategies capture the upcoming
demographic dividend in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Ethiopia?**

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Abstract

The 21st century is going to witness a significant global population dynamic change, with Africa taking the growth lead. Recognizing great potential this may mean for Africa, this paper examines Swiss and EU development strategies in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia through the lens of “demographic dividend” to explore if and how the former capture this upcoming opportunity in the three most populous SSA countries. By developing a Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool based on “health,” “education,” “local employment” and “migration” – the former two being the “pre-conditions” for the demographic dividend process and the latter two the “translation factors” – and channelling the relevant Swiss and EU development strategies through it, this paper arrives at the conclusion that Swiss and EU international development strategies help the capturing of upcoming demographic dividend in the three SSA countries by supporting the local pre-conditions, especially health, and to a certain level and in various ways the translation factor of employment, mainly domestic employment.

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III. List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific (Groups of States)
AU	African Union
DDR	Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy (limited to Footnote 2 on p.11: “DDR” there stands for “Demographic Dependency Ratio”)
DEHZO	Directorate of Development and Technical Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid for Central and Eastern Europe
DFAE	Département Fédéral des Affaires Étrangères
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDF	European Development Fund
EDR	Employment Dependency Ratio
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund
EUTF Africa	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOB	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goal

MP	Multidimensional Poverty
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEM	State Secretariat for Migration
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SDR	Socioeconomic Dependency Ratio
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPFA	United Nations Population Fund
VET	Vocational Education and Training
VP	Vice-President of the European Commission
WWP	World Population Prospects

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
1 Introduction

1.1 Relevance of the Topic

In this 21st century, the population on earth will continue to grow and with “a different dynamic”: at the same time of demographic stagnation or shrinkage in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and increasingly also the emerging markets, Africa is going to witness a huge population boost – by 2050, the population in Africa may double from the current 1.3 billion people, and by 2100, the number may reach 4-5 billions (Groth & Dahinden, 2020, p.71). Figure 1 below exhibits the projected upcoming change in the world population composition by continent – under the United Nations (UN) *World Population Prospects (WPP) 2019* median variant projection, Africa will steadily increase its share of the total world population, from today’s 17.20% to 39.36% in 2100. This will have strong social, political and economic implications. Indeed, demographic shifts have been identified by a recent UN report as one of the five megatrends that have shaped our world and will continue to influence global progresses and dynamics in the years to come (UN Economist Network, 2020, p.3).

Figure 1.

Percentage of World Population by Continent (WPP2019 median variant projection)




Note. This graph is created by the author based on data from United Nations *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.*

The three most populous Sub-Saharan African countries – Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Ethiopia – will be strong engines behind such population growth. Under UN *WPP 2019* median variant projection, the three countries are going to further double, triple or even quadruple its population size in the next 80 years, and at the end of this century, the three countries combined will hold more than 12.7% of the total world population (Nigeria 6.739%, the DRC 3.329%, Ethiopia 2.707%) – in comparison, the share of China will drop from this year’s 18.5% to 9.8% in 2100, and that of India will drop from 17.7% to 13.3%. The significance of the change to the global population dynamic is manifest.

Population is a country’s base and driving force. Its volume and structure present different opportunities and challenges. For example, a small population denotes a more limited domestic market, and an aging population may present issues regarding pension and elderly care. With a very young and fast growing population, African countries have the potential for a “Demographic Dividend,” which is based on a high ratio of working-age population to dependent population.

Figure 2.

Percentage of World Population (Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia) (WPP2019 median variant projection)




Note. This graph is created by the author based on data from United Nations *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.*

Nevertheless, population profile itself does not guarantee a demographic dividend. African countries have the *potential* for a demographic dividend, but should there be not enough jobs and other supportive macro conditions to turn the growing working-age population into productive workers, a demographic dividend will remain a *potential* not a *reality*. In fact, inability to activate such transformation means for a country not only the loss of opportunity of capturing a demographic dividend, but also the risk of social instability associated with large groups of unemployed youth without decent future prospects. The latter can also have spill-over effects in neighbouring countries and beyond as the jobless migrate, via legal or illegal ways, to seek jobs and earn a living in a foreign land.

Therefore, the discussion about the upcoming demographic dividend in Africa – and especially that in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia (the three most-populated African countries by 2050 as well as by 2100) – is not just relevant but necessary. The large increase in the working-age population in the three countries as illustrated in Figure 3 underlines the urgency to address human development and employment creation, so to capture the upcoming demographic dividend – a failure to do so will put regional stability as well as global welfare at stake, as in a globalized world as today, opportunities and challenges in any part of the world are closely linked to that of the others.

Figure 3.

Working-Age Population (15-64) in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia (WPP2019 median variant projection)



Note. This graph is created by the author based on data from United Nations *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.*

Now that Africa is the only continent on earth to have a significant population growth potential in the coming years of the 21st century, if and how African countries capture their demographic dividend and how foreign countries aid in such process will have significant impact on local social welfare and economic development as well as international social, economic and political dynamics.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives

While the big picture encompasses the whole of African continent as well as the whole globe, this paper will focus on development strategies from namely two international actors (Switzerland and the European Union (EU)) in three sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries (Nigeria, the DRC, and Ethiopia). It will pore on Swiss and EU development strategies relevant to Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia at different levels (overarching, region-specific and country-specific). Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia are chosen as they are estimated to be the most populated African countries by 2050, with estimated populations of 401, 194 and 205 millions respectively – as well as by 2100, with 733, 362 and 294 millions respectively, according to UN *WPP 2019* median variant estimates. Such large population bases will make the effects of capturing – as well as the failure in capturing – the demographic dividend especially felt, both in their domestic arenas and abroad.

The overarching question this paper aims to answer is “To what extent do development strategies capture the upcoming demographic dividend in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia?” In pursuing the answer, the paper seeks to both understand the strategies’ visions and engagements on the theoretical level and to gauge their potential real impact on the ground in regards to demographic dividend capturing according to the three SSA countries’ own specific national circumstances.

1.3 Research Methodology

To fulfill the previously mentioned two sub-goals in pursuing the big answer, the paper will employ a research methodology consisting of the following four main parts:

- (1) Understand the concepts of “demographic dividend,” “development” and “development strategies” via literature review and decide on the paper scope;
- (2) Develop a Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy (DDR) Tool via literature review and self-reasoning;
- (3) Identify relevant development strategies and evaluate them via the DDR Tool;
- (4) Connect theory with reality by exploring relevant aspects of Nigerian, Congolese and Ethiopian domestic circumstances via national level data and matching the Swiss and EU development strategies to them.

For the strategy review, in order to maximize the objectiveness and completeness of the sources, this paper will base upon primary sources, including official strategy and/or policy documents and information on the official government websites, rather than secondary sources such as third party evaluations and other forms of literature review. Moreover, the focus of such review is on the strategies’ original aims and intents, not their implementation afterwards – the latter may be referred to when it helps better depict or understand the former, but itself is not a topic that this paper engages itself further with.

2 Definition and the Scope of the Paper

2.1 “Demographic Dividend”

“Demographic dividend” is a concept that was developed after examining the “economic miracles” in the East Asian countries in the 1960s-1990s (Groth et al., 2019, p.63). What was found was that demographic dividend contributed to about one-third (according to Bloom and Williamson’s calculation in 1998 via econometric analysis) or one-fourth (according to Mason’s calculation in 2001 via growth accounting methods) of the increase in per capita income in the Eastern and South-Eastern Asian countries (Mason, 2005, p.81).


Currently, the concept of “demographic dividend” has been adopted by many scholars and organizations, and a few different strands of understanding have been developed, including the sub-categorization of first, second and third demographic dividend. The first dividend is the most common demographic dividend in discussion, referring to the economic growth potential associated with the change in a population’s age structure, when its share of working-age population (aged 15 to 64 years) exceeds its share of non-working-age, or dependent, population (aged under 14 years, and 65 and older)¹ (Mason, 2005) – its time window is limited, bound to expire when this working-age bulge grows to the older age dependent end. The second demographic dividend is a result of capital accumulation during one’s working years, fueling “capital deepening and more rapid growth in output per worker” when invested in the domestic economy, and “an improvement in the current account and an increase in national income” when invested abroad – this dividend may last for an indefinite time (Mason, 2005, direct quotations from p.84). The third demographic dividend denotes the potential societal benefit from a larger population of older and aging adults (Fried, 2016). The third demographic transition has also been postulated by Coleman (2006) to be one that is linked to the change in the ethnic – instead of age – composition of a nation’s population, thus reminding the broad scope of elements “demography” may hold.

Should we return back to the original conceptualization point for demographic dividend as economic surplus generated from a higher share of working-age population and thus focus on the age aspect of demography, we can find that different regions of the world are currently in different demographic transition phases. As Fried (2016) stated, “[m]ost countries of the world are emerging from the first or are in various stages of the second demographic transition” (p.S167). Quantitatively, the window of the first demographic dividend is open when the ratio of working-age population (aged 15 to 64 years) to dependent population (aged under 14 years, and 65 and older) equals or exceeds 1.7 (Cilliers, 2019, as cited in Kaps et al., 2019, p.10). Thus, based on UN *WPP 2019* data (median variant projection for year 2020-2100), Figure 4 presents the working-age to dependent population ratio of each of the six continents to illustrate the world’s first demographic dividend dynamic by continent.

¹ What the United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA) defines as “Demographic Dividend” is this first dividend (*Demographic dividend*, 2016).

Figure 4.

(15-64)/(U15 + 65+) Ratio by Continents (WPP2019 median variant projection)




Note. This graph is created by the author based on data from United Nations *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition, Rev. 1.*

It can be seen that Europe, Oceania and Northern America, having enjoyed their first demographic dividend window in the 20th century already, will see its closure at around 2030. Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean will have their first demographic dividend window closed at around 2055 with Asia having past its ratio peak in 2015 and Latin America and the Caribbean passing in 2020. Africa is the only continent that is yet to open its window of opportunity for the first demographic dividend – such window is estimated to open at around 2055 and will remain open beyond 2100. This opportunity window is estimated to be open earlier for Ethiopia – in 2040 – and some years later for Nigeria and the DRC – in 2060 (see Figure 5).

Therefore, pertaining to both Africa as a continent and Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia as specific countries, first demographic dividend is currently the most imminent and hence relevant out of all three kinds of demographic dividend related to a population's age structure. While the second demographic dividend may start soon after the first dividend begins, thus owning certain levels of imminence and relevance as well, one needs to recall that such second dividend is a result of people earning then saving in preparation for their retirement years and/or other needs and that the level of such forward-looking motive to save is difficult to assess at present time, so are the

Figure 5.

(15-64)/(U15 + 65+) Ratio for Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia (WPP2019 median variant projection)



Note. This graph is created by the author based on data from United Nations *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.*

future national policies on social security system that will impact people’s saving behaviour. Hence this paper will solely focus on the first dividend when addressing “demographic dividend” in the chapters to come, leaving out considerations for the second and the third dividends. For the rest of the paper, the term “demographic dividend” will be used interchangeably with the term “first demographic dividend.”

2.2 Development and Development Strategies

As Mason (2005) has pointed out: “the economic outcome from demographic change is policy dependent” (p.82), political engagement can play an essential role in capturing demographic dividend. Before we go into the specifics of what exact policies may have this effect, it is important to first examine the concept “development” itself as to understand the overall dimension of “development strategies.”

What indicates development? Development of what? While one may hone in on one aspect (for example, economic advancement) or refer to various indicators (for example, Gross National Income (GNI) per capita) and indexes (for example, Human Development Index (HDI)) as well as the latest UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in answering this question, the questions seem still to be open, without an ultimate consensus and conclusion.

Indeed, the concept of “development” in the international political economy is a man-made, not natural, one and has its history traces back to only the mid 20th century. It is linked to specific historic and ideological backgrounds and is subjective, not intrinsic, in nature. During the inter-war years, the concept of “underdevelopment” did not even exist as a subject to any rigorous theorizing, and “development” first entered international debate in the 1950s when under political equality, the economic inequality between the new sovereign states post decolonization and the already industrialized states became evident and called for a resolution to this political-economic imbalance (Barling & Akinrinade, 2013, pp.1-2). The initial scholar responses were “essentially humanitarianism based on the Western value system” – the West was assumed to be the model for *the* “developed state” and a homogeneous world culture, one that is “based broadly upon the West’s culture (or perhaps, the ‘American way of life’), would emerge as a result of such “development” (Barling & Akinrinade, 2013, p.2). Such conceptualization was then criticized for its lack of consideration for nations’ own distinct historical conditions as well as the dominant position the North had over the South in the international political economy in influencing the path and result of development (Barling & Akinrinade, 2013, pp.3-5). What came afterwards were the *internal critique* (or *liberal critique*), which examined the historical specificities and sought transformation of the internal social structures for economic growth – it was the dominant practical approach during the first UN Development decade – and the *external critique* (or *Marxist critique*), which looked at the North-South relation and asked if underdevelopment is a necessary product of capitalism – it was a widely used rhetorical concept during the late 1960s and 1970s (Barling & Akinrinade, 2013, pp.3-6). These two schools of thought took development largely as economic development. In the 21st century, we have the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000-2015) and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2016-2030) being the overarching guidelines for world development efforts, containing resolve for not only economic development but also development in spheres of health, education, social equality, environment and more (UN, 2015; UN General Assembly, 2015).

Therefore, an evolution of the development concept on the international level can be seen in the past decades. The understanding of development is more all-encompassing in the current 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as more ambitious, yet the issue of subjectivity and limitedness persists: any set of indicator(s) we choose for measurement “must be *ipso facto* selective as well as subjective,” hence rendering holistic and objective assessment of development impossible (Barling & Akinrinade, 2013, p.7).

Under this light, this paper recognizes the complexity and ideological subjectivity surrounding the words “development” and “development strategies” and does not proclaim what ought to be the ultimate truth for national development. Respecting the policy issuers’ own ways of thinking and value systems, the paper will simply *adopt* Switzerland and the EU’s positions on development strategies rather than defining criteria to *qualify* certain strategies to be development strategies. Such strategies examined will include both overarching development strategies as proposed by Switzerland and the EU and regional and country-level partnerships and relations related to Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia – the latter may not have “development” explicit in their titles, but they shall be examined for their inherent influence on local development.

Undeniably is a nation’s own domestic development strategies essential and significant in guiding and prompting national development, but such is outside of the scope of this paper and hence will not be examined.

3 Evaluation of Development Strategies from the Demographic Dividend Angle

3.1 The Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool

Having had a preliminary discussion on demographic dividend and development strategies and defined their concept scopes, this paper now aims to extract elements from the former to develop an evaluation tool via which a development strategy’s potential in capturing demographic dividend may be assessed. This tool will be referred to as “the Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool” or “the DDR Tool,” and its compositing elements “the Elements.”

Recalling that demographic dividend is based on a higher working-age to dependent population ratio, to turn such a favourable population age structure into an actual dividend, a

sufficient level of employment for the growing working-age population is vital. The idea of economic growth behind a large working-age population lays on the assumption that the working-age population actually works and earns a decent income, hence producing a higher collective GNI when the group is larger given a fixed productive output per person.² Without employment, a working-age person becomes a dependent instead, surrendering his/her opportunity to contribute to societal economic advancement at the same time generating negative production by consuming the output produced by others. Without a decent income, an employed person can also be counted as a dependent in a stricter sense when his/her job income falls below his/her consumption line, creating as well a net negative production. Therefore, employment can be called the “translation factor” in the demographic dividend capturing process, translating favorable population structure (higher proportion of working-age in comparison to dependent) into productive surplus, and both its quantity and quality³ aspects are important in the capturing of the demographic dividend – quantity activates the transformation of human capital into economic productive output in the first place and quality boosts this per capita productive potential.

Such *more* and *better* employment desired and needed for the growing working-age population may be realized in either the domestic labour market or a foreign one. In the domestic market, this translates to domestic job creation and upgrade of employment to higher-value-adding activities. In the foreign market, this denotes labour migration and mobility.

² Groth et al. (2019) introduces three dependency ratios when evaluating the dependency burden, each more stringent than the previous one: the **demographic dependency ratio (DDR)***, the **employment dependency ratio (EDR)** and the **socioeconomic dependency ratio (SDR)**. The DDR is that of the common first demographic dividend discussion, based on the interplay of non-working-age and working-age populations. The EDR takes employment into consideration and is the ratio of unemployed population to actual working population, regardless of the age background. The SDR views people whose income is lower than consumption as the dependent population, even if they are employed and receive income, and those whose income is higher than consumption the supporting one.

This gives a good leveled understanding to dependency ratio and its associated economic surplus when the ratio is lower. The DDR, EDR and SDR are progressively more accurate in capturing the share of individuals with net positive production (or income), but information needed for their calculation is also progressively more difficult in obtaining. If to put this paper’s understanding of dependency ratio into Groth et al. (2019)’s categorizations, it would be built on the DDR while also taking into considerations of the EDR and the SDR in the form of noticing the *employed-or-not* and *how-much-income* aspects of employment.

(*The abbreviation of DDR standing for “demographic dependency ratio” is limited to this footnote only.)

³ As demographic dividend is about economic production, the “quality” aspect of employment in this paper shall equate to the income level.

The foundations to the “translation factor” are the “pre-conditions,” which ensure fit-to-work working-age population in the first place – if the working-age population is not fit-to-work, then its inherent productive potential will not, or only to a very little extent, be unlocked. This fit-to-work-ness includes both the physical employability (health) and the technical employability (education). It can be reasoned that without good physical health, early deaths and debilitating illnesses would weaken a working-age population’s output capacity and increase dependence burden, and without appropriate education, one’s level of productivity would be limited. This assessment is confirmed by various scholars: Bloom et al. (2016) states that, “[b]etter health and education of the young boost aggregate productivity growth once the young cohort enters the workforce” (p.3), and Drummond et al. (2014) has found “significant interaction between the human capital and the magnitude of the demographic dividend” which indicates that “improving and increasing access to education is critical to improve the productivity of workers and support a transition to higher valued added sectors” (p.18).

Therefore, “health” and “education” (the pre-conditions) and “local employment” and “migration” (the translation factors) constitute as the four Elements to the DDR Tool utilized in this paper – see Table 1 below. Note that while one is to combine “local employment” and “employment abroad (migration)” under the concept “employment” when understanding the effect of employment in realizing demographic dividend, a separation of the two can usually be seen in development strategy papers, where one can often equate “employment” with “local employment” and find “migration” an explicit topic by its own.

In the tool, Element Health concerns first and foremost the *most basic* health needs that a person holds in order to survive and be productive – this includes food and nutrition, water and sanitation besides primary healthcare; policy engagement with health services above such basic level will also be taken into consideration. Element Education leverages on employability for its link to employment; while specialized skills and vocational training on the higher education level may link more directly to employment and productive output, fundamental primary and secondary education are also paramount in developing one’s cognitive, literary, mathematical and other general capabilities, thus all levels of education would be concerned here. Element Local Employment considers both the quantity and quality aspects of employment. Element Migration, while pointing at labour migration and mobility as the most fitting form of migration in the demographic dividend discussion, takes notice of all kinds of migration in the policy space, so to

Table 1.

The Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool

	Pre-conditions		Translation factors	
	Health	Education	Local Employment	Migration
Development strategy 1				
Development strategy 2				
...				

- = top-level priorities
- = non-top-level priorities or associated activities
- = background colour

Note. The colours and the structure of the visual presentation of this tool are inspired by Table 4.1 in the 2018 IOB Study *Transition and inclusive development in Sub-Saharan Africa* on p.107.

understand the situation of this cross-border option in a fuller picture.

Channelling development strategies through this tool will result in highlighted understanding in the four specified domains, showing whether the examined development strategy paves the foundation for the upcoming demographic dividend, or actively unlocks the current demographic dividend, or does neither of the two, owning little relevance to demographic dividend capturing. An ideal development strategy for demographic dividend capture would have positive emphasis on both of the pre-conditions and at least one of the translation factors, especially if such elements are proven to be in need of great improvement. Different policy focuses will be evident with the colour differentiations, in which manner the comparison along the timeline as well as across countries and categories can be conducted.

3.2 Evaluation of Swiss Development Strategies

3.2.1 *Overview of Relevant Swiss Development Strategies*

International assistance and development in Switzerland only started to become a formal structure at the end of the Second World War, with the forebody of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Dienst für technische Hilfe, established in 1960 (*History of the SDC*, 2017, row 8). Currently, official development assistance is one pillar of Swiss diplomacy (*History of the FDFA*, 2020, para. 4).

Swiss development cooperation with the South and the East is one of the four components to the wider Swiss international cooperation, which also includes multilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid and the promotion of peace and human security (*What is the difference between international, development and transition cooperation?*, 2018, para. 1). Development cooperation is “a Swiss foreign policy instrument that is used to help eradicate poverty and promote human rights” (*What is the difference between international, development and transition cooperation?*, 2018, para. 4), while international cooperation is “an integral part of Switzerland’s foreign policy and economic foreign policy and its long-standing humanitarian tradition” (*The rationale for Switzerland’s commitment*, 2017, para. 3).

Switzerland’s Federal Constitution highlights humanitarian solidarity in the sphere of Swiss international development cooperation: Article 54(2) states that Swiss Confederation “shall in particular assist in the alleviation of need and poverty in the world and promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful co-existence of people as well as the conservation of natural resources.” Furthermore, Swiss international cooperation is also rooted in Switzerland’s own self-interest, as it recognizes that “[g]lobal political, economic and ecological changes have a direct impact on the quality of life inside Switzerland’s borders” (*The rationale for Switzerland’s commitment*, 2017, para. 1). Hence, welfare of those inside Switzerland’s borders and of those outside are two interrelated goals of Swiss international development efforts.

Previous to the name change from Directorate of Development and Technical Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid for Central and Eastern Europe (DEHZO) to Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in 1996, Swiss international development efforts were by name centred on Central and Eastern Europe (*History of the SDC*, 2017, row 1). The current focus of the SDC includes fragile and conflict-affected regions alongside Eastern Europe (*SDC in brief*,

2019, para.2 & para.7). Priority countries and regions of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean have been identified for concentrated SDC South Cooperation efforts, of which the priority is “to provide disadvantaged population groups with access to basic services (basic healthcare and education) and infrastructure (water), as well as employment and income generation opportunities” (*SDC in brief*, 2019, para. 9).

On the broadest level, the strategic focus of Switzerland's international cooperation is renewed every four years and presented in a dispatch. These Dispatches on Switzerland's International Cooperation set out the priorities and focal areas for Swiss international development agenda in the corresponding dispatch years and are the overarching guidelines to Swiss international cooperation efforts. At the same time, as mentioned before, Switzerland has identified priority countries and regions for its bilateral development cooperation with the South, each with its more specified country or regional strategy.⁴ The Great Lakes region, which includes the DRC, has since 2013 been identified as a priority region (previously Rwanda/Great Lake was identified as a “Special Programme” from 2006 to 2012), and the Horn of Africa, which includes Ethiopia, since 2013. Nigeria, in the 21st century, has never been identified as a priority country nor a part of a priority region for Swiss bilateral development cooperation, but it has been included in the Lake Chad Region⁵ as a focus area for Swiss humanitarian aid since 2016. Both the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa have also been focus areas for Swiss humanitarian aid.

Therefore, on the topic of Swiss development strategies in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia, this paper is concerned with overarching strategic Dispatches (namely the latest two Dispatches of 2017-2020 and 2021-2024), regional strategies and country-specific focuses of Swiss international cooperation. Humanitarian aid is of consideration when observing the composition of Swiss development assistance – while humanitarian aid's focus on emergency aid and relief makes it distinct from long-term development, Swiss humanitarian aid's other two core areas of

⁴ This paper identifies “Special Programme” and “Priority Country/Region” for SDC Development with the South by the categorization in the Annual Reports for Swiss International Cooperation and/or their Statistics sections.

⁵ On one official document, Lake Chad region as a focus area for Swiss humanitarian aid covers Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon (*Priority Countries and Focus Regions for SDC (Status April 2019)*, n.d.), while on another official statement, the region as a focus area for SDC humanitarian aid only denotes Chad and Niger (*Priorities of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid*, 2019), thus it seems uncertain if Nigeria is actually included in the Lake Chad region as a Swiss humanitarian aid focus area. Nigeria as a country was specified for being a Swiss humanitarian aid recipient country in 2015, the first time since 2000 as per *Swiss International Cooperation Annual Report and/or Statistics 2000-2015*.

“Sustainable reconstruction” and “Disaster preparedness and prevention” align with further development agendas (*SDC in brief*, 2019, para. 5).


3.2.2 *Swiss Strategies via the Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool*

Channeling the above mentioned Swiss international development strategies through the Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool, we obtain Table 2.

Table 2.

Swiss Development Strategies via the DDR Tool

Swiss development strategy	Pre-conditions		Translation factors	
	Health	Education	Local Employment	Migration
<i>Overarching:</i>				
Dispatch 2021-2024	Light Green	Light Green	Dark Green	Dark Green
Dispatch 2017-2020	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green
<i>Regional-level:</i>				
Regional strategy for the Lake Chad	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green
Regional strategy for the Great Lakes	Dark Green	Light Green	Dark Green	Light Green
Regional strategy for the Horn of Africa	Dark Green	Light Green	Light Green	Dark Green



Note. The colours and the structure of the visual presentation of this tool are inspired by Table 4.1 in the 2018 IOB Study *Transition and inclusive development in Sub-Saharan Africa* on p.107.

Overarching:

Since 2000, **poverty reduction and sustainable development**, in accordance with Article 54(2) of the Swiss Constitution, have been the underpinning and main focuses for Swiss international development efforts on the overarching level – this can be seen in the Annual Reports for Switzerland’s international cooperation from year 2000 until 2016 and the two latest Dispatches. As early as in 2000, Swiss development efforts defined its approach to poverty reduction as “providing help towards self-help,” and education and basic healthcare for the most disadvantaged population groups were included as aspects for targeted improvement (SDC, n.d. a, the page before p.1). Currently, all four Elements of health, education, local employment and migration have been covered as priority areas in Dispatch 2017-2020 and parts of the strategic goals for Swiss international cooperation 2021-2024 (employment as part of the goal “economic development,” and health, education and migration as parts of the goal “human development”); in Dispatch 2021-2024,⁶ employment and migration have been further highlighted as two thematic

⁶ By “Dispatch 2021-2024,” this paper means the messages contained in *Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)* (n.d.).

priorities (*Focal areas and priorities*, 2017, para.3; *Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)*, n.d., p.26 & pp.29-32).

In the latest Dispatch 2021-2024, Switzerland deems jobs a “key factor” for poverty reduction and economic development, and it aims to promote the private sector and to especially support young entrepreneurs in realizing their potential of creating decent jobs; an aspect of education is included here as Switzerland will take its own vocational training system as a model and promote training with high labour market relevancy to assist the vision on local decent job creation (*Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)*, n.d., p.29). Previously in the Dispatch 2017-2020, Switzerland also stressed the importance of increasing job quality and quantity, accompanied with its support to basic education and vocational training (*Focal areas and priorities*, 2017, para.3).

In both Dispatches, health (including water and food security) has been included as an element of global challenges that Switzerland has dedicated itself to tackle (*Focal areas and priorities*, 2017, para.3; *IC: Jobs, climate, migration and the rule of law*, 2020, para.7). Health and education are the two main components to the high-quality basic services Swiss international cooperation aims to provide under its “human development” goal for 2021-2024 (*Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)*, n.d., p.26).

On the topic of migration, Switzerland is currently most interested in the reduction of forced and irregular migration and the protection of migrants and refugees, not so much in facilitating more labour migration into Switzerland. While recognising the important role regular migration has always had on country development and poverty reduction (e.g. via knowledge transfer, remittances and trade promotion), Dispatch 2021-2024 then remarks on the unavoidability of negative factors relating to brain drain, integration costs and social cohesion in even regular migration (*Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)*, n.d., p.30). The strategy paper very clearly states that “*Die Schweiz hat ein Interesse daran, Flucht und irreguläre Migration zu reduzieren sowie den Schutz der Migrantinnen, Migranten und Flüchtlinge zu verbessern*” (Switzerland has an interest in reducing flight and irregular migration and improving the protection of migrants and refugees), as better management of migration in these situations would not only better the economic and social conditions in the concerned region(s) of origin or transit but also positively benefit Switzerland (*Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)*, n.d., p.30).

Hence, Switzerland plans on strengthening the strategic link between its international cooperation and migration policy, extending to cover all instruments of international cooperation, to achieve its short-, medium- and long-term goals in the sphere of irregular migration reduction and protection for the displaced (*Botschaft zur Strategie der internationalen Zusammenarbeit 2021–2024 (IZA-Strategie 2021–2024)*, n.d., p.30).

Regional level:

Lake Chad (including Nigeria):

While certain countries in the Lake Chad region like Chad and Niger have been many years priority countries for SDC cooperation with the South, the region as a region has not been similarly prioritised on the Swiss development agenda in the 21st century. The region, meanwhile, became a focus area for SDC humanitarian aid in 2016 and had remained so in 2019.⁷ SDC humanitarian aid grounds on emergency humanitarian assistance on the one hand, and the strengthening of the legal framework related to humanitarian aid provision on the other hand (*Priorities of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid*, 2019, para.2) – health aspect is therefore covered under the former as an element to the most basic needs needed to be delivered; indeed one health aspect “Water and sanitation” has been identified as one of the four priorities for the period 2017-2020 (*Priorities of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid*, 2019, para.4). Specifically in the Lake Chad region, SDC humanitarian involvements have included health support in areas including food security, water, sanitation and hygiene, life-saving medical care and mental health/psychosocial support, and education for children (SDC, 2018, pp.1-2; SDC, 2019, pp.1-2).

The Great Lakes (including the DRC):

The Great Lakes was the first out of the three concerned regions to receive special attention from SDC Development with the South in the 21st century, being a “Special Programme” (a

⁷ In one official document, namely *Priority Countries and Focus Regions for SDC (Status April 2019)* (SDC, n.d. c), Lake Chad region as a focus area for SDC humanitarian aid covers Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while on another official statement, namely SDC webpage *Priorities of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid* (2019), the region as a focus area for SDC humanitarian aid denotes only Chad and Niger.

category parallel to “Priority Countries and Regions”) from 2006 to 2012 and a “Priority Region” from 2013 until now. Swiss presence in the Great Lakes region actually dates all the way back to the 1960s, with development cooperation programmes carried out in the subsequent 30 years; however, since the 1990s, the primary focus of Swiss involvement there has shifted to humanitarian aid and peace policy (*The Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo)*, 2020, para.8), with further involvement in the 21st century of amplified commitments to development aid and peace policy especially since 2006 and stabilised humanitarian aid at a high but decreasing level (Département fédéral des affaires étrangères [DFAE], 2017, p.9).⁸

The reason for the SDC’s special attention in the region is its fragile context – as the regional strategy 2017-2020 stated in 2017, the Great Lakes region had been afflicted with extremely violent armed conflicts since the 1990s and while parts of the region had seen improvement in stability since then, eastern DRC was still facing repeated security and humanitarian crisis (DFAE, 2017, p.5). The general objective of Swiss development actions in the region has centred on peace and stability, poverty reduction and the protection of civilians (DFAE, 2017, p.15). In order to achieve this, Switzerland has identified strengthening employment, especially for young people, and health as two key areas of intervention (DFAE, 2017, pp.15-16). The SDC has a long-standing commitment to health and governance, and programming on job and income was a new addition in 2013, driven by the realization of both the importance employment, and especially youth employment, has on stability, and the importance economic development has on social advancement (DFAE, 2017, p.5 & p.11). By 2017, the SDC had pursued a two-pronged strategy for local employment: it had supported the farming sector (which employed 80% of the population) with higher productivity and market access, and it had leveraged on vocational training and sector modernisation to create employment opportunities outside of the farming sector (DFAE, 2017, p.11). To date, Switzerland continues to support quality vocational education and training as a mean to promote employment and to increase income, and cross-border exchanges have also been considered for its economic potential (DFAE, 2017, p.16). As for health, the SDC focuses on basic healthcare in crisis situations, and has since 2010 also included attention on certain health determinants including water, sanitation and child nutrition (DFAE, 2017, p.11 & p.16).

⁸ However, the level of Swiss humanitarian aid to the DRC has been rising in recent years as shown in Figure A-2 in Annex A, reflecting the specific context of the DRC.

The Horn of Africa (including Ethiopia):

The Horn of Africa became a “Priority Region” for SDC Cooperation with the South in 2013 and has remained so until today. The reason behind the SDC’s elevated attention in this region is similar to that in the Great Lakes, which is fragile context – against the backdrop of several long-lasting local conflicts and chronic and recurrent food insecurity, the 2011/2012 drought and famine and Somalia’s conflict triggered Switzerland’s response of increased commitment and a long-term engagement in the region (SDC (Ed.), 2013, p.6; SDC et al. (Eds.), 2018, p.13).

Both the overall objectives and the main priorities for Swiss cooperation in the region have remained mostly the same for strategy periods 2013-2016 and 2018-2021: the overall goals have centred on poverty reduction, human security improvement, stability and state building and migration challenges, and the main priorities have been food security, health, migration and governance (SDC (Ed.), 2013, p.6; SDC et al. (Eds.), 2018, p.13).⁹ Recalling the evolving Swiss cooperation modality of increasing development aid and decreasing humanitarian assistance in the 21st century in the Great Lakes region, such vision had also been held for Swiss efforts in the Horn of Africa, but local recurrent humanitarian emergencies have continued to demand humanitarian inputs, thus slowing down the shift of the Swiss cooperation approach to a more development-focused one (SDC et al. (Eds.), 2018, p.17).¹⁰ Food, health and protection have been deemed as the basic needs that Switzerland wishes to help ensure locally, and its intervention in such sectors focuses both on directly benefiting the people and on building the system (SDC et al. (Eds.), 2018, p.20). Migration meanwhile has taken on more significance in this regional strategy, as on the federal level Switzerland came to seek more strategic involvement of migration policy in international cooperation with the federal decree BBl 26.09.2016/7875¹¹ and the Horn of Africa stands strategically in the route of irregular migration from Africa to Europe (SDC et al. (Eds.),

⁹ *Swiss Cooperation Strategy Horn of Africa 2018–2021* decided to keep the four priorities from the previous strategy period as the experience had proven them to be “relevant” and that they “respond to the most urgent needs of the population, address the key drivers of fragility in the region and correspond to Switzerland’s areas of technical expertise and policy priorities” (p.18).

¹⁰ Specific to Ethiopia, however, a drop in humanitarian-aid/total-ODA ratio in the 2010s compared to the 2000s may be noticed – see Figure A-3 in Annex A.

¹¹ The decree states that, as quoted in the *Swiss Cooperation Strategy Horn of Africa 2018–2021* (p.43): “ ‘A strategic link should be established between international cooperation and migration policy when this serves Switzerland’s interests, by further addressing causes of conflicts and migration. Entering into agreements and partnerships in the area of migration should be encouraged’ (BBl 26.09.2016/7875).”

2018, p.22 & p.43). Education and employment are aspects included in migration: Switzerland supports skills development programmes as a mean to socially and economically integrate the refugees and to reduce conflicts between the refugees and the host community, forming a part of the durable solutions to protracted displacement,¹² and supports improved labour mobility as it “acknowledge[s] the need of the globalized economy for a mobile work force” (SDC et al. (Eds)., 2018, pp.21-22 & pp.43-44, of which direct quotation from p.43).

Country-level:

Nigeria:

As mentioned before, Nigeria itself, nor its region of Lake Chad, has never been identified as a priority region or a special programme of SDC Development Cooperation with the South in the 21st century – this lack of SDC development attention on Nigeria is mainly attributed to Nigeria’s status of not being a low-income country (Embassy of Switzerland in Nigeria, 2019, para.1).¹³ As the Lake Chad region became a focus area for Swiss humanitarian aid in 2016, Nigeria itself started to receive humanitarian aid from Switzerland in 2015 as per documentation on *Swiss International Cooperation Annual Reports and/or Statistics 2000-2016*. According to Swiss Confederation’s website, food security, protection and education are the three focuses of SDC Humanitarian Aid in Nigeria (*Development and Cooperation*, 2019, para.5). Figure A-1 in Annex A exhibits the history of Swiss bilateral official development assistance (ODA) to Nigeria from 2000 and a strong humanitarian aid composition can be noticed for 2015-2018.

¹² “To support durable solutions” is one of the three objectives of Swiss regional cooperation on migration and protection (SDC et al. (Eds)., 2018, p.21), and “increased socio-economic integration” has been identified as “one aspect of durable solutions to protracted displacement” (SDC et al. (Eds)., 2018, p.44).

¹³ If we take the World Bank country-by-income classification for the current 2021 fiscal year, which sets the lower threshold for lower middle-income economies to be \$1,036 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current USD), then Nigeria moved up from the low-income category to lower middle-income in 2006; however, one must also recognize that Nigeria from 1982 until 1984 also had yearly GNI per capita values above \$1,036 – see Figure B-1 in Annex B (*World Bank Country and Lending Groups*, n.d., para.1; World Bank, 2020a).

Furthermore, while the SDC currently has no cooperation office in Nigeria due to the country’s non-low-income status, the Embassy of Switzerland in Nigeria has meanwhile been offering support to five to six small-scale projects yearly for local development assistance – better health and education conditions have been listed as ones of the past project outcomes (Embassy of Switzerland in Nigeria, 2019).

Apart from the humanitarian aid consideration, the Switzerland-Nigeria relation has been weighing heavily on economic partnership and political dialogues that include the topic of migration. As of December 2018, Nigeria was Switzerland's second-largest trading partner in SSA after South Africa, and Swiss efforts in local employment development included direct investments of approximately USD 300 millions that provided around 4,000 jobs (*Bilateral Relations Switzerland–Nigeria*, 2018, para.7). Migration-wise, a migration partnership was established between Switzerland and Nigeria in February 2011, serving as a “centrepiece” of the Switzerland-Nigeria bilateral relation (*Bilateral Relations Switzerland–Nigeria*, 2018, para.4; State Secretariat for Migration [SEM] & Federal Department of Foreign Affairs [FDFA], 2012, para.1).¹⁴ The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two countries covers a wide range of migration-related areas, among which there are “return assistance,” “readmission and reintegration,” and “migration and development (including remittances, Diaspora, brain drain and gain” (*Memorandum of understanding between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the establishment of a Migration Partnership*, Article II). In exploring the positive contribution migration can have to development in the country of origin, the two countries eye the existing Nigerian diasporas in Switzerland while encouraging educational exchanges; to deal with irregular migration, a process of return-readmission-and-reintegration of Nigerian nationals illegally residing in Switzerland has been put in place together with local information campaigns in Nigeria that aim to raise awareness and to discourage further irregular migration of this kind (*Bilateral Relations Switzerland–Nigeria*, 2018, paras.5-6; SEM & FDFA, 2010, paras.2-3; SEM & FDFA, 2012, paras.2-3). While this migration partnership seems to occupy itself more with sending illegal Nigerian migrants back to Nigeria than enlarging foreign receival capacity for the growing Nigerian population, providing vocational education and training to the Nigerian returnees as a part of Swiss return assistance may contribute to better future employment prospects for these Nigerian returnees (*Bilateral Relations Switzerland–Nigeria*, 2018, para.6).

¹⁴ Nigeria was both the first African country that Switzerland established a migration partnership with and the only SSA country that Switzerland held such a partnership with as of December 2019; as of December 2019, the other countries/regions that were in a migration partnership with Switzerland were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Tunisia and Sri Lanka (*Migration partnerships*, 2019, para.3; *Migration*, 2017, para.5).

The DRC:

Swiss development cooperation in the DRC on the country level largely reflects Swiss regional strategy for the Great Lakes.

Ethiopia:

Swiss development cooperation in Ethiopia on the country level largely reflects Swiss regional strategy for the Horn of Africa. It is worthy of further elaboration that while Switzerland has heightened its attention on migration on both the federal and the Horn of Africa regional levels, in implementation, its efforts in collaborating on return and readmission with Ethiopia had “not yielded satisfactory results” and had remained a challenge for Switzerland (SDC et al. (Eds), 2018, pp.16-17 & p.22)

Furthermore, as a part of Swiss cooperation in education, Nigerian, Congolese and Ethiopian nationals have all been granted eligibility by Switzerland for application of Swiss Government Excellence Scholarships to pursue research or doctoral/post-doctoral level education in Switzerland (*Bilateral relations Switzerland–The Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2017, para.6; *Bilateral relations Switzerland–Ethiopia*, 2020, para.6; *Bilateral Relations Switzerland–Nigeria*, 2018, para.10; *Swiss Government Excellence Scholarships for Foreign Scholars and Artists for the 2021-2022 Academic Year*, n.d.).

3.2.3 *Short Sectional Summary*

Under the overarching goal of **poverty reduction and sustainable development**, Swiss international cooperation has covered all four DDR Elements of health, education, local employment and migration in its two most recent Dispatches (Dispatch 2017-2020 and Dispatch 2021-2024). Health and education are parts of the Swiss endeavour for human development, an aspect of humanitarian solidarity that is enshrined in the Swiss Constitution. Attention in employment and migration has been gaining momentum in the 2010s, as Switzerland has increasingly realized the importance of (decent) jobs in local poverty reduction, economic

development and eradication of the root causes to irregular migration, and high numbers of irregular migrants into Switzerland from certain countries of origin or transit have prompted Switzerland to strategically position migration in the framework of international development. Both Nigeria and Ethiopia are significantly concerned in this latter part, as Switzerland has been coordinating bilateral migration dialogues with the two countries – while recognition and encouragement of positive aspects of regular migration are present, these dialogues have weighed heavily on return and readmission agreements, a flow in the direction opposite to that of labour mobility out of the African countries.

The Great Lakes (including the DRC) and the Horn of Africa (including Ethiopia) regions have become special attentions of SDC Development with the South since 2006 and 2013 respectively, both for their fragile contexts. Nigeria, as not a low-income country, has not been focused on by SDC Development with the South; however, its regional armed conflict has led to its receipt of Swiss humanitarian aid in the recent years. Meanwhile, the DRC and Ethiopia, either by themselves or as a part to their corresponding region, have received Swiss humanitarian intervention throughout the most parts of the 21st century, according to the Annual Reports and/or Statistics for Swiss international cooperation 2000-2018. Thus the consideration of fragility and its effect on development is highly relevant here.

Regarding the two pre-conditions for demographic dividend in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia, health has been a major component to the Swiss humanitarian-centred development efforts in fragile contexts, while education has received less concentration. Health here includes not only basic healthcare, but also food security and nutrition, water, sanitation and other relevant health aspects. The existing support in education includes education provision for children in displacement and vocational skills trainings that aim at boosting better employment and income outcomes thereafter – a strong link between education and employment can be seen here. Recalling the prioritization of employment and migration in Dispatch 2021-2024, employment has been highlighted in Swiss development strategy in the DRC but not much in Nigeria and Ethiopia – in the latter two countries, Swiss efforts in employment has either taken the form of direct investment, as in Nigeria's case, or been an element of assistance to the displaced, as in Ethiopia's case.

Overall, facing the current and upcoming working-age population increase in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia, Swiss development strategies have been concerned about the future prospects for the African youth and have increasingly recognized the importance of employment and income.

Its efforts in local health and education in the three countries have supported the foundation of human capacity development, and its emphasis on employment in the Great Lakes region has the potential to not only unlock the productive potential of the local population but also contributing to local stability and socioeconomic outlooks. Its various vocational skills training and employment programmes in other contexts may also contribute to the improvement of both the quantity and quality of local jobs and the people's future professional prospect. At the same time, as a significant part of Swiss bilateral ODA to the three countries has been humanitarian aid, the humanitarian-development nexus not only reflects Swiss values and humanitarian solidarity but gives also the reminder that in specific contexts like that of fragility, economic surplus consideration ought to come only *after* the most urgent issue of most basic human needs provision.

3.3 Evaluation of EU Development Strategies

3.3.1 *Overview of Relevant EU Development Strategies*

With its forebody, the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958 for increased economic cooperation between six European countries, the European Union (EU) was founded in 1993 to reflect the expanded scope of the EEC from a purely economic union for six countries to one that encompasses many other policy areas, including climate, environment, health, external relations, security, justice and migration, for then 12 countries (currently 27 Member States) (EU, n.d. a & n.d. b). The EU was officially created in 1992 during the Treaty on European Union (or the Maastricht Treaty), which then entered into force on 1 November 1993 (*Treaty of Maastricht on European Union*, 2018, line 5 and line 85 under "Text"). Therefore the EU development strategies, by definition, come only thereafter.

The EU defines its development cooperation to be "one major element of a wider set of external actions, all of which are important and should be coherent, mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other" (European Consensus on Development, para. 58, as in Michel, 2006, p.31). It anchors on the primary objective of poverty reduction and, in the long term, eradication (The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 208; the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 21(2)d). Its concept of "development" is multi-faceted, often

including the economic, political, cultural and/or social aspects and matched with the broader development agenda of the UN – for example, the MDGs and the SDGs in the 21st century.

The EU has development strategies on several levels. Concerning Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia, there are relevant EU development or cooperation policies on the overarching, regional and country levels. Humanitarian aid will also be briefly examined as a parallel to the Swiss analysis.

Overarching:

In 2005, the EU established its first common framework regarding its development cooperation efforts, defining for both the Community and the Member States the “common values, principles, objectives and means” concerning development cooperation (Michel, 2006, p.3). That was the 2005 European Consensus on Development. It was replaced by the New European Consensus on Development in 2017, as a response to external events and contextual changes that had happened since then, including the global demographic shifts, persisting environmental problems, the expansion of the development landscape and the adoption of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 (European Commission, 2016b, pp.5-6). The 2011 Agenda for Change and the 2016 EU Global Strategy are two other important strategies of considerations – the former shifted the focus of EU development assistance to those most in need and where the EU could have the most felt impact, and the latter aligned different strands of EU policies,¹⁵ including development policies, to achieve a greater EU strategic advancement in the world.

Regional-level:

On the regional level, the Cotonou Agreement¹⁶ and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) are the two most significant EU development frameworks with the Africa region. The former was

¹⁵ The EU Global Strategy states that, “Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States” (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2016, p.26).

¹⁶ The full name to the 2000 Cotonou Agreement is the “Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000.” In the following in-text citations, the “Cotonou Agreement” will be used as a shortened version for its aforementioned full name.

signed in 2000 between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, and the latter was adopted in 2007 by the EU and the African Union (AU) (*The Partnership and Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, n.d., para.1). As the Cotonou Agreement was to come to an end in February 2020, the EU published a communication “A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific” in November 2016. The progress of the AU-EU relationship was exhibited in the communication “for a renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership,” published in May 2017. Also worthy of note is that Africa-EU Partnership is currently among the five priorities of overall European Commission international cooperation and development, highlighting the importance and urgency the EU has placed on its collaboration with the continent (*Our work*, n.d., line 13).

Country-level:

The EU has individual bilateral relations with each of the three countries – Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia. While the Cotonou Agreement is “the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU” (*Nigeria and the EU*, 2016, para.1), country-specific characteristics can also be observed when viewing the EU’s involvement priorities in each of the three SSA countries. The EU’s National Indicative Programme (NIP) in a partner country lists out the focal areas and the key objectives of EU bilateral development cooperation during the applied European Development Fund (EDF) round – this paper will examine the NIPs 2008-2013 and 2014-2020 (corresponding to the 10th and the 11th EDFs) in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia. Certain other bilateral development programming will also be examined due to their relevancy.


3.3.2 *EU Strategies via the Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool*

Channeling the above-mentioned EU international development strategies through the Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool, we obtain Table 3.

Table 3.

EU Development Strategies via the DDR Tool

EU development strategy	Pre-conditions		Translation factors	
	Health	Education	Local employment	Migration
<i>Overarching:</i>				
The New European Consensus on Development (2017)	High	High	High	High
EU Global Strategy (2016)	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
Agenda for Change (2011)	High	High	High	High
European Consensus on Development (2005)	High	High	High	Low
<i>Continent-level:</i>				
A renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership (2017)	Low	Medium	High	Medium
A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (2016)	High	High	High	High
Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) (2007)	High	High	High	High
Cotonou Agreement (2000)	High	High	High	High
<i>Country-level</i>				
Bilateral EU-Nigeria	High	Low	Low	Medium



Note. The colours and the structure of the visual presentation of this tool are inspired by Table 4.1 in the 2018 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) Study *Transition and inclusive development in Sub-Saharan Africa* on p.107.

Overarching:

On the overarching level, **poverty reduction/eradication in the context of sustainable development** has remained the main objective of EU development cooperation since the 2005 Consensus, while one – as in a 2020 report by Jones et al. (p.11) – may judge there to be a shift of focus from the front of the package (“poverty reduction/eradication”) in the 1990s and 2000s to the back of the package (“sustainable development”) in the 2010s. In the 2005 Consensus, the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation was stated to be “the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (European Consensus on Development, para. 5, as in Michel, 2006, p.12). The latest 2017 New Consensus has reiterated this central commitment to poverty eradication¹⁷ while recognising the change of approach to global development as reflected by the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs (*The New European Consensus on Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’*, 2017, p.3 & p.9).

Health, education and employment were previously among the highlighted areas for Community action under the 2005 Consensus and are currently under the “People” aspect of the 2017 Consensus. A stronger rhetoric and a more ambitious goal have emerged: while in the 2005

¹⁷ It states that, “Eradicating poverty, tackling discriminations and inequalities and leaving no-one behind are at the heart of EU development cooperation policy” (*The New European Consensus on Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’*, 2017, p9).

Consensus, the tone of EU development actions in these issue areas centred on “betterment” and in some cases “targeted betterment,” the EU’s goal and action plan in the 2017 Consensus are more comprehensive – it declares that the EU and its Member States “will pursue an end to hunger and *all* [emphasis added] forms of malnutrition as well as promote *universal* [emphasis added] health coverage, *universal* [emphasis added] access to quality education and training, adequate and sustainable social protection, and decent work for *all* [emphasis added] within a healthy environment” (*The New European Consensus on Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’*, 2017, p.9).

The Agenda for Change was introduced in 2011 to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU development actions by concentrating its resources on countries and sectors where it could have the greatest impact – it was prompted by the observation that there had emerged an enlarged differentiation among developing countries, where certain developing countries had become donors in their own right while others remained to struggle with poverty and/or fragility (European Commission, 2011, p.3). This hints at increased assistance attention the three SSA countries shall receive, especially the DRC and Ethiopia, who have remained in the Low Income Country category and have been exposed to recurring fragility. Health, education and jobs were defined by this strategy as pillars to “a **more comprehensive approach to human development**” that the EU should take (European Commission, 2011, p.7). Job creation was deemed as an important engine to inclusive growth, and employment was further considered in regional labour mobility, where the EU declared to “support targeted efforts to fully exploit the interrelationship between migration, mobility and employment” (European Commission, 2011, pp.7-8). Overall, a departure from the traditional donor relationship of the 20th century can be seen in this 2011 Agenda for Change, with the EU “aim[ing] to ensure a smooth **transition from humanitarian aid and crisis response to long-term development cooperation**” (European Commission, 2011, pp.11-12), which is based on “**greater reciprocal engagement** with its partner countries, including mutual accountability for results” (European Commission, 2011, p.5).

Further shift of EU development actions towards EU strategic interests was then manifested in the 2016 EU Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, which called for a stronger Europe and advocated for the interests of the EU’s own in this interconnected world. Development assistance was deemed necessary as Federica Mogherini (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the

European Commission (HR/VP)) spoke of the lesson learnt by the EU, “my neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses” (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2016, p.4). Under this train of thought, the EU will further invest in African peace and development as “an investment in [EU’s] own security and prosperity” – development efforts there will cover health, education and migration, among others, and growth and job stimulation is of stressed importance (EEAS, 2016, p.36).

Regional-level:

EU development strategies on the Africa regional level match with those on the overarching level. On the core objective, the Cotonou Agreement also states that that of the EU-ACP partnership to be “reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 1, para.2).¹⁸ The JAES came from a strategic nature and aimed at promoting sustainable development in both continents (*JAES*, 2007, p.2). In mid-2010s, both partnerships took the EU Global Strategy as one of the foundations to their renewed frameworks, indicating the increased weight of EU’s own strategic interests in both partnership engagements (European Commission & HR, 2016, p.4; European Commission & HR, 2017, p.3).

Both the Cotonou Agreement and the JAES have considerations on all four Elements of health, education, employment and migration. Job creation and human and social development – the latter includes improved education and training, health systems and nutrition – are among the fundamental goals of the ACP-EU development strategies (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Arts. 20(1) & 25(1)). Meanwhile migration is a “subject of in-depth dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 13(1)) – envisaging normalised migratory flows in the long run, the EU and the ACP countries via the Cotonou Agreement focus on the economic and social development of countries *of origins* rather than on the expansion and upgrade of reception capacity of countries *of destination* (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 13(4)); when the EU trains ACP nationals in its Member State(s), the intention is to afterward better integrate them vocationally in their own countries of origin rather than in the EU Member States (Cotonou

¹⁸ The Cotonou Agreement gives elevated support to the least-developed ACP States (including the DRC and Ethiopia) and landlocked ACP States (including Ethiopia) (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Part 5, Arts. 85 & 87; Cotonou Agreement, 2000, ANNEX VI, Articles 1 & 3).

Agreement, 2000, Art. 13(4)). Meanwhile, the JAES includes all four demographic dividend aspects under its fourth strategic priority area, “Key development issues: accelerating progress towards the MDGs.” The EU recognized “supporting Africa’s efforts to achieve the MDGs” to be “the key challenge for the EU’s external and development cooperation policy vis-à-vis the continent” in 2007 (*JAES*, 2007, p.12). In order to tackle this challenge, the EU voiced its dedication to the strengthening of the entire education systems and national health systems and to solving employment issues, both regarding its quantity and quality, in Africa (*JAES*, 2007, p.13-14). The migration-development nexus here highlighted the potential positive development impacts of the diaspora communities and remittances, at the same time voicing the concerns over “brain drain in sensitive sectors like health and education” and irregular migration (*JAES*, 2007, p.16).

A growing emphasis on the EU’s own interest, or mutual interest instead of one-sided benefit for the assistance-receiving party, became apparent in the two new communications on the EU-ACP and the EU-AU relations. While in the original JAES, the EU and Africa has already presented their interest in “mov[ing] away from a traditional relationship and forg[ing] a real partnership characterised by equality and the pursuit of common objectives” (*JAES*, 2007, p.3), the 2017 communication “For a renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership” further reveals the ever more inextricable influence Africa has on both the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s own security and prosperity – this time, the eagerness of the EU-AU partnership lays not only on “equality and the pursuit of common objectives” but also on being “stronger, deeper and more action-oriented” to contribute to “more prosperity and stability in the two continents” (European Commission & HR, 2017, p.3). Previously, the 2016 communication on a renewed ACP-EU partnership has also expressed this deeper understanding of Africa’s influence on the EU, affirming that “[i]nvesting in African peace, stability, and development not only benefits our partners but is also an investment in the EU’s own security and prosperity” (European Commission & HR, 2016, p.15).

Health, education, employment and migration have continued to be on the priority lists of ACP-EU and Africa-EU partnerships. On the ACP-EU level, the EU aspires for development and dignity for all human beings, and “equitable access to decent work and social services, in particular quality education and health, and social protection” are among the conditions it wishes to ensure (European Commission & HR, 2016, p.12). Tailored to Africa, the focus on decent job creation,

quality education and training, and health remains – health covers from food security to sanitation that can prevent the spread of communicable diseases to the strengthening of health systems; quality education and training stresses the need for better aligning education to labour market needs hence generating higher employability; and job creation, among others, explores the potential of the private sector (European Commission & HR, 2016, pp.16-18). The EU is especially concerned with jobs and future prospects for the growing youth in Africa. Highlighting the creation of more and better jobs, especially for youth, as one of its two main action strands, the new impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership identifies and targets sectors with the largest potential for sustainable job creation to “create the jobs that the continent needs and to seize the opportunities it offers to Europe” (European Commission & HR, 2017, pp.5-6 & pp.14-16, of which direct quotation is from p.5). The revitalised Africa-EU Partnership further supports Vocational Education and Training (VET) and entrepreneurship besides universal primary and secondary education to better forge synergies between education systems and the labour market (European Commission & HR, 2017, p.22).

As for migration, while the EU still recognizes and supports the potential positive effects of regular migration and mobility on growth and development in the EU and partner countries – for example, via remittances, diasporas and “brain circulation” – there has been elevated attention on more effectively addressing irregular migration and facilitating the return and readmission of irregular migrants as a result of increasing numbers of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Europe from Africa and a record high level of migration and mobility flows (including forced displacement) within Africa in recent years (European Commission & HR, 2016, pp.11-12; European Commission & HR, 2017, pp.12-13). Local job creation is involved in this migration context as a mean to “addresses root causes of destabilisation, irregular migration, forced displacement and trafficking in human beings” (European Commission & HR, 2017, p.13). Regional differences also exist for EU migration engagement in Africa: while labour migration and mobility (a supposed foreign solution to high domestic job demand) is among the focuses for the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF Africa)¹⁹ in the North of Africa

¹⁹ The EUTF Africa was set up in 2015 by not only the EU but also its Member States and donors including Switzerland to support local stability and to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement in Africa (EUTF Africa, n.d. a, paras.1-4) – it is a part of the EU migration-development nexus. One of its strategic lines of action is “greater economic and employment opportunities” – this applies to all three regions where it is active in, namely the Horn of Africa, the North of Africa, and the Sahel and Lake Chad, including Ethiopia and Nigeria (EUTF Africa, n.d. d).

region, it is nevertheless not among such in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel/Lake Chad regions – instead, the focus there dwells on irregular migration, of which “return and reintegration” and “refugees management” are included (EUTF, n.d. d, paras.6-7).

Country-level:

Framed by the EU’s overall agenda on external actions and umbrellaed under relevant regional EU strategies, bilateral EU-Nigeria, EU-DRC and EU-Ethiopia relations have also their own distinctions.

Nigeria:

Specific to Nigeria is the intensified Nigeria-EU dialogue and enhanced cooperation since 2008, with the initiation of the *Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward* (signed in 2008, came into force in 2009) to take the Nigeria-EU relation to a new level. In this new political framework, the EU considers Nigeria as a “natural and strong [partner],” who “share[s] common values and ideals, [...] believing in peace and security, equality, democracy and tolerance as ways of developing prosperous and generous societies” (*Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward*, n.d., p.2). The associated priority action areas are peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade and regional integration and key development issues including but not limited to energy, environmental sustainability and climate change. None of the four DDR Elements (Health, Education, Local Employment and Migration) are stated as explicit priorities here.

Nevertheless, “health and nutrition” is one of the three key development sectors for EU cooperation under the 11th EDF (2014-20) in Nigeria – “Health, nutrition and resilience” took up the most indicative allocation amount with €240 million (49.9% of NIP), while the other two key sectors, namely “Sustainable energy and access to electricity” and “Rule of Law, governance and

This paper does not engage deeply with the implementation aspect of the strategies, but EUTF Africa results in Ethiopia and Nigeria may give inspiration as to how international efforts in the fourth DDR Element (Migration) may contribute to the first three (Health, Education and Local Employment):

- In Ethiopia, the EUTF Africa uses vocational training, micro-finance and industrial parks to achieve its strategic line of action of “greater economic and employment opportunities,” and has so far benefited 13,331 people with professional trainings and/or skills development, created 16,167 jobs in total, and assisted 52,447 people with development of economic income-generating activities (EUTF Africa, n.d. b);
- In Nigeria, given the local fragile context, the EUTF Africa works to better the access to basic services and to build self-reliance as parts of the LRRD (“linking relief, rehabilitation and development”) approach, and has helped so far 480,600 people in receiving basic social services (EUTF Africa, n.d. c).

democracy,” were allocated with €150 million (29.3% of NIP) and €90 million (17.6% of NIP) accordingly (*National Indicative Programme for the period 2014 - 2020, European Union–Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 2014, pp.7-8). EU actions in the health focal sector centres on “sector governance reform at Federal and State levels as well as reducing malnutrition and increasing access to services” (*National Indicative Programme for the period 2014 - 2020, European Union–Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 2014, p.11). The EU’s overall objective here is “to contribute to a reduction in poverty through improving policy and institutional governance to enhance health status, social cohesion, increasing maternal and child survival rates and strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable households especially in northern Nigeria” (*National Indicative Programme for the period 2014 - 2020, European Union–Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 2014, p.16). Previously in the 10th EDF programme (2008-13), “Health and nutrition” was not among the priority areas for Nigeria – the three priorities then were “Peace and security,” “Governance and human rights” and “Trade and regional integration”; “Health and immunisation” was, however, among the three non-focal sectors with emphasis as a continuation of immunisation programmes that were funded by the 7th and 9th EDFs (*Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013, European Community–Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 2009, pp.82-83).

At the same time, while not having gained strong expressions in the *Nigeria - EU Joint Way Forward* and targeted only its management aspect in the 11th EDF, migration is the centrepiece of a local dialogue on migration and development that the EU and Nigeria had agreed to set up in parallel – this NG-EU dialogue on Migration Development is supported by development cooperation and aspires at the maximisation of positive development effects of remittances and diasporas, the prevention and reduction of irregular migration as well as the management and facilitation of legal migration (*Nigeria and the EU*, 2016, para.5). Nigeria has also become one of the five priority countries under the EU 2016 Migration Partnership Framework, which is a comprehensive approach to migration by the EU and its Member States focusing on irregular migration and forced displacement – increased labour migration to the EU is not among the short term objectives of the Framework but “increase[d] rate of returns to countries of origin and transit” and “[enablement of] migrants and refugees to stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous journeys” (European Commission, 2016a, pp.5-6). Therefore, a

combination of fostering the positive development potential of regular migrations and curbing irregular migration is on the agenda of EU-Nigeria relation.

On the humanitarian aid front, the EU currently (as of May 2016) focuses on the north-eastern part of the country, working to provide the local displaced with basic needs (*Nigeria and the EU*, 2016, last paragraph). From the start of 2014 until May 2016, EU humanitarian assistance in Nigeria had amounted to €33 million (*Nigeria and the EU*, 2016, last paragraph).

The DRC:

The EU's current strategic focuses in the DRC evolve around democracy and human rights, peace and stability and poverty reduction via sustainable and inclusive growth (*Congo (Democratic Republic of)*, n.d., para.3). In the latest 11th EDF NIP for the DRC, "Health sector" is one of the four focal sectors alongside "Environment and sustainable agriculture," "Governance and the rule of law" and "Transport." The fund allocations among the sectors are relatively even, with the four receiving 24%, 21%, 26% and 24% of the total national indicative amount accordingly (*Programme Indicatif National 11^{ème} Fonds européen de développement 2014-2020, La Commission européenne–le gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo*, 2014, p.5). The focus on health here is in conjunction with the LRRD ("linking relief, rehabilitation and development") concept and aims at better accessibility to quality health care, improved institutional capacity and the integration of health zones covered by humanitarian interventions (*Programme Indicatif National 11^{ème} Fonds européen de développement 2014-2020, La Commission européenne–le gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo*, 2014, p.5). Previously in the 10th EDF, health was also a focal sector in the DRC, with governance and transport infrastructure being the other two. Health and transport have been adopted by the EU as the two main approaches to poverty reduction in the DRC since the 8th and the 9th EDFs, when EU cooperation with the DRC was mainly under a post-conflict context (*Document de stratégie pays et Programme indicatif national du 10^e FED 2008-2013, République démocratique du Congo–Communauté européenne*, 2008, p.17). Therefore, the continued focus on health development and the meanwhile minor attention on education and employment in the DRC exhibit the EU's focused attention in specific situations.

The EU has been a humanitarian aid provider to the DRC since 1994 (*More EU aid for Democratic Republic of Congo as crisis in Kasai worsens*, 2017, para.10). The EU has identified

there to be a “**chronic humanitarian crisis**” in the DRC due to recurring conflict, further characterised by “malnutrition, epidemic outbreaks and vast numbers of forcibly displaced people” (*The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the EU*, 2016, para.17; *More EU aid for Democratic Republic of Congo as crisis in Kasai worsens*, 2017, para.7). In conflict zones, the EU provides emergency assistance to the displaced or vulnerable; in zones not affected by conflict, the EU via its Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid arm targets “acute malnutrition, food insecurity and epidemics (particularly measles and cholera)” (*The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the EU*, 2016, paras.18-21) – all parts of the “Health” Element. The close interplay between humanitarian assistance and development and a strong focus on health in fragile contexts are apparent here.

Ethiopia:

The level of the EU-Ethiopia relation was enhanced in 2016 with the signing of a Joint Declaration towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement, aligning agendas on sustainable development, among others, and aiming to support Ethiopia in fulfilling its ambition of becoming a middle income country on a green and inclusive growth path (*Ethiopia and the EU*, 2016, para.3). Among the six sectoral dialogues committed, “migration” is one (*Ethiopia and the EU*, 2016, para.2).

As stated in the NIP for Ethiopia 2014-2020, the current strategic focus of the EU’s relationship with Ethiopia is “to support Ethiopia in making decisive progress in sustainable socio-economic development”; having identified six main development challenges in Ethiopia – among which “ensuring food security” is directly linked to health, “sustaining fast, broad-based and transformative economic growth” may include employment quantity and quality, and “promoting basic services and gender equity” may include education besides health – the EU has adopted enhancing food security and population nutrition level and increasing both access to and the quality of health services as two of the main means to achieve this strategic development goal (*National Indicative Programme for Ethiopia 2014 to 2020, the Government of Republic of Ethiopia–the European Commission*, 2014, pp.4-5). In the 11th EDF NIP, food security (and sustainable agriculture) and health take up two of the three focal sectors for EU cooperation in Ethiopia, receiving 33.9% (or €252.4 million) and 26.8% (or €200.0 million) of the total indicative amount respectively with the third focal sector “Roads (phasing out) and energy (phasing in)” receiving 30.9% (*National Indicative Programme for Ethiopia 2014 to 2020, the Government of Republic of*

Ethiopia—the European Commission, 2014, p.3). Previously in the 10th EDF NIP (*Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013, Ethiopia–European Community*, 2007), food security (and agriculture) was also among the focal sectors, alongside transport and macro-economic support, highlighting the EU’s commitment to better the nutrition condition in the country. Meanwhile, education, employment²⁰ and migration have not been explicit focal targets of the EU’s development efforts in the country under the 10th and the 11th EDFs.

Migration is an important aspect in the EU-Ethiopia relation. Ethiopia, as a country of origin, transit and destination of migrants from the region, has been identified by the EU as “a key partner for the stability and the management of migratory flows in the region,” and among other things, the EU recognizes “the interest of Ethiopians in migrating to neighbouring countries and regions in search of labour” (*Ethiopia and the EU*, 2016, para.24). Like Nigeria, Ethiopia is one of the five priority countries under the New Migration Partnership Framework. The Partnership Framework (European Commission, 2016a) aims at keeping irregular migrants and refugees close to their origin, while assistance in local job creation, via including vocational training, is provided by the EU as a mean to improve the economic conditions of the origin and the future prospects for the locals, in this manner addressing the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration.

EU humanitarian aid action in Ethiopia has covered from assistance to refugees to help for vulnerable local communities in face of natural hardship; basic services including food, safe water, healthcare and education have been provided (*Ethiopia and the EU*, 2016, paras.19-20; *Ethiopia*, 2020, paras.7-12).

3.3.3 *Short Sectional Summary*

Poverty reduction/eradication in the context of sustainable development has been the main objective of EU development cooperation in the 21st century. On the overarching level, all four DDR Elements are currently been keenly engaged with. Migration, previously not an area of

²⁰ This policy reading targets employment as an explicit topic itself; however, an integration of different aspects is possible – for example, an improvement in the agriculture sector may mean higher agricultural capability and productivity, leading to more and/or better employment for the locals.

emphasis in the 2005 Consensus, has become increasingly centred in the EU international cooperation focus. In 2016, with the EU Global Strategy, a synthesis of all strands of EU policy, including that of development, has been called for, with the goal of advancing the EU's interests in this world.

On the Africa continental level, employment has risen as one of the most key strategic considerations for EU cooperation. The EU is especially concerned about the African youth and their future prospects, and education and its improvement have been addressed as steppingstones to better employment outcome and sustainable development. Meanwhile, across the ACP-EU Partnership plane, health, education, employment and migration have all been explicit development targets since the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. EU attentions on local health and education have remained as parts of EU dedication to human development, and migration is in this on-going dialogue on migration and mobility, which both recognizes the positive effects regular migration can have on development of both countries of origin and destination and aims to address irregular migration for its associated negative consequences – the latter lays at the heart of the 2016 Migration Partnership Framework, of which Nigeria and Ethiopia are two priority countries.

On the country level, health has been the one DDR Element that has been most engaged with by the EU in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia since 2008, with its sub-focuses varied among the three – among others, while access to quality healthcare has been a shared intervention area, health assistance is linked with the LRRD concept in the DRC, attention on food security is especially strong in Ethiopia, and high level sector governance reform is involved in Nigeria. Just as the EU chose health and transport as the two main means to poverty reduction in the DRC under a post-conflict context, health is a fundamental element in the EU's strive for better human development and sustainable development. Education and local employment in the three countries, in the meantime, have not been prioritised in EU bilateral cooperation, understandably shadowed by other policy areas considered by the EU to be the *most* or *more* urgent need(s) of the impacted population.

Therefore, differences exist between EU development strategies on the overarching and regional/continental levels and those on the country level: while EU development strategies on the higher levels strongly endorse all four Elements, health is the only main focused DDR Element on the country level of EU development cooperation with Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia; on the higher levels, Element Migration recognizes the positive potential regular migration has on

development and labour migration and mobility has taken by the EUTF as a focus for the North of Africa region, in contrast to the migration EU-Nigeria and EU-Ethiopia relations have been involved with, where labour migration only takes up a minor role, if at all, as the core of the Migration Partnership Framework lays on irregular migration. Such illustrates the specific contexts of Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia. The EU is ready to push forward the “translation factors” on the overarching and regional/continental levels, but so far the EU has only focused on the “pre-condition” of a healthy population in the three SSA countries to solidify the foundation for future translation of human capital to economic output and hence demographic dividend capture to come.


4 Understanding Impacts in the Local Contexts

The previous policy review of Swiss and EU development strategies in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia gave a theoretical presentation of the strategies’ relevance to capturing the upcoming demographic dividend in the three SSA countries. The strategies reflect Switzerland and the EU’s own understanding of the concept and the application of development and their own interests and priorities. In order to more exactly understand the strategies’ impact on the receival countries, it is imperative to be informed of the latter’s own national characteristics and circumstances, so as to be able to see if and how the international development strategies from foreign countries fit with the domestic needs.

On the overall level, Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia have all experienced certain levels of economic growth in terms of rising GNI per capita – see Annex B for graphic presentations: in 1994, Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia owned a GNI per capita of 310, 160 and 160 current USD accordingly, whereas in 2019 that indicator has risen to 2,030, 520 and 850 accordingly (World Bank, 2020a). As both Swiss and EU development strategies centre on poverty reduction, it is worthy to recognize the progress the countries have made in the sphere of poverty reduction. As Figure 6 shows, given the limited data, a decrease of poverty headcount can be observed in the DRC and Ethiopia, while the poverty headcount in Nigeria has rather plateaued. The figure compares the three countries to their respective income group as well as the SSA average and finds the DRC and Nigeria to have values much higher than the averages while Ethiopia has visibly outperformed the comparison groups in the 21st century.

Figure 6.

Percentage of Population Below the Income Poverty Line of \$1.90 A Day (2011 PPP)



Note. Graphs created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)* (data last updated on 2020/9/8).

Yet poverty by the definition of income level may tell only parts of the story, as the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) with consideration of health, education and standard of living paints a much more alarming poverty picture in Ethiopia. In 2015, 30.8% of the Ethiopian population was deemed to be living below the income poverty line of purchasing power parity (PPP) \$1.90 a day at 2011 international prices (World Bank, 2020b), yet multidimensional poverty

Table 4.

Levels of Income Poverty and Multidimensional Poverty in Nigeria, the DRC, Ethiopia and SSA

Country/Region	Income Poverty	Multidimensional Poverty (MP)					
	Population living below PPP \$1.90 a day (%)	Population in MP		Population vulnerable to MP	Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall MP		
		Total	In severe MP		Health	Education	Standard of Living
	(%)	Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall MP (%)					
2007-2017 ^a	(2016/2017 for Nigeria, 2013/2014 for DRC, 2016 for Ethiopia)						
Nigeria	53.5	51.4	32.3	16.8	27	32.2	40.8
DRC	76.6	74.0	43.9	16.8	26.1	18.4	55.5
Ethiopia	27.3	83.5	61.5	8.9	19.7	29.4	50.8
SSA	44.7	57.5	35.1	17.2	22.2	29.6	48.1

Note. ^a= Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.


Data in this table is from UNDP, *2019 Human Development Data All Tables and Dashboards*.

headcount for the population reached 83.5% in 2016 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2019a), creating a substantial gap in between. The differences between headcounts for income poverty and for multidimensional poverty in Nigeria and the DRC are meanwhile much smaller – see Table 4.

Therefore, just as “development” may be approached and evaluated from different angles, so is “poverty.” Indeed, if we link the discussion of poverty to population development, we will find Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia to all be positioned lowly in – as in the bottom quintile of – the Human Development Index (HDI)²¹ 2018 (Nigeria at the 158th place, Ethiopia the 173rd place, and the DRC the 179th place, out of a total of 189 countries and territories) (UNDP, 2019b, p.2; UNDP, 2019c, p.2 UNDP, 2019d, p.2). Yet this too did not come without progress. As Figure 7 below presents, all three component indices of the HDI (namely life expectancy, education and GNI per capita) as well as the overall score of the three countries have all witnessed significant – though some more than others – growth since 2000. This gives encouragement and momentum to further human development and economic growth when poverty still persists as a prevailing challenge in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia.

Figure 7.

Historical Trends in HDI Component Indices for Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia



Source: Graph (a) is taken from p.3 of UNDP *Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report: Nigeria*; Graph (b) is taken from p.3 of UNDP *Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report: Congo (Democratic Republic of the)*; Graph (c) is taken from p.3 of UNDP *Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report: Ethiopia*.

²¹ The HDI centres on people and their capabilities as an essential component to national development and measures achievements in three dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living (*Human Development Index (HDI)*, n.d.).

We shall now examine the specific national circumstances in regards to the four DDR elements – namely health, education, local employment and migration – and their implications on the Swiss and EU development strategies.

Element Health:

While the decline in infant and maternal mortality has been the main reason behind population growth in Africa in recent decades (Groth & Dahinden, 2020, p.71), the numbers of infant and under-five deaths are still very high in the three SSA countries (especially in Nigeria and the DRC). Recalling the concept of demographic dividend to be one relied on a higher working-age to dependent population ratio as workers produce while dependents consume, early death and poor health of young dependents would negatively affect such dividend as early death means no productivity and only dependency in one’s life, and unhealthy young dependents would increase dependency burden in the immediate run and lead to less productivity upon entering working-age if such unhealthy condition persists or has caused long-term damage to one’s capabilities.

Table 5 below displays that all three SSA countries have child stunting rates above the SSA and Low Human Development Country averages – given the large population base in these three countries, this means a very significant number of children under-nourished; while Ethiopia has performed better than the averages on the infant and under-five mortality front, both Nigeria

Table 5.

Child Malnutrition, Infant and Under-Five Mortality Rates for Nigeria, the DRC, Ethiopia and SSA and Low Human Development Country Averages

Country/ Region/Human development group	Child malnutrition	Mortality rates	
	Stunting (moderate or severe)	Infant	Under-five
	(% under age 5)	(per 1,000 live births)	
	2010-2018 ^a	2017	2017
Nigeria	43.6	64.6	100.2
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	42.7	70.0	91.1
Ethiopia	38.4	41.0	58.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	36.2	51.3	74.7
Low human development	38.3	52.8	76.6

Note. ^a= Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

Data in this table is from UNDP, *2019 Human Development Data All Tables and Dashboards*.

and the DRC have mortality rates noticeably higher than the two averages. Among all poor health conditions, child malnutrition is worth highlighting as it is a significant contributor to under-five mortality and can lead to “impaired cognitive ability and reduced school and work performance” (*Malnutrition, 2020*). Switzerland and the EU’s development attention on food security and nutrition in all three SSA countries has thus been placed in a much needed context and ought to help strengthen the pre-condition to human development and demographic dividend. Swiss and EU efforts in other health-related fields, including access to and quality of healthcare systems, water and sanitation and more, can also contribute to the support of a healthy population, in this way laying foundation for a higher productive output by the working-age.

Elements Education and Employment:

It is suitable to combine Elements Education and Employment here as both Switzerland and the EU have actively linked the former to the latter in their development strategies.

According to the latest HDI data as excerpted in Table 6 below, Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia all have high primary school enrolment rates and less-than-half secondary enrolment rates – the former comes with considerable primary school dropout rates; information on tertiary enrolment is unavailable for Nigeria, and those for the DRC and Ethiopia only stand at single

Table 6.

Gross Enrolment Ratios and Primary School Dropout Rates for Nigeria, the DRC, Ethiopia, SSA and All Human Development Groups

Country/Region/Human development group	Gross enrolment ratio			Primary school dropout rate
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	
	(% of primary school-age population)	(% of secondary school-age population)	(% of tertiary school-age population)	(% of primary school cohort)
	2013-2018 ^a	2013-2018 ^a	2013-2018 ^a	2007-2017 ^a
Nigeria	85	42	..	35.6
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	108	46	7	54.7
Ethiopia	102	35	8	61.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	99	44	9	43.2
Low human development	96	40	9	44.6
Medium human development	111	70	23	18.1
High human development	104	95	46	..
Very high human development	102	107	79	4.1

Note. ^a= Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.


Data in this table is from UNDP, *2019 Human Development Data All Tables and Dashboards*.

digits. The education enrolment situations in the three SSA countries largely reflect the average situation for both the SSA and Low Human Development countries as per HDI categorization. There is much potential in improving the primary school dropout situation and the enrolment rates for higher level education in those countries.

The education-employment correlation follows a different pattern in the three examined SSA countries from that of developed economies. In stark contrast to developed countries and areas including the Euro area, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, where labour force with higher education level usually has a lower unemployment rate, the correlation between education level and unemployment rate in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia is either positive or mixed (World Bank, 2020c, 2020d & 2020e). As Figure 8 below shows, according to as much data as World Bank has on such topic in the three SSA countries for the timeframe 1960 to 2019, Nigeria and the DRC present a positive correlation between education level and unemployment – which means a higher percentage of labour force with higher education level is out of job – and Ethiopia keeps a situation in which labour force with intermediate education level has the highest

Figure 8.

Unemployment Rate with Different Levels of Education in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia



Note. The graphs are created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *Unemployment with basic education (% of total labor force with basic education)* (data last updated on 2020/10/15), *Unemployment with intermediate education (% of total labor force with intermediate education)* (data last updated on 2020/10/15) and *Unemployment with advanced education (% of total labor force with advanced education)* (data last updated on 2020/10/15).


unemployment rate.

Meanwhile, it can be noted that there have also been changes happening over the time. For example, in Ethiopia, while labour force with intermediate education level has stayed as one having the highest unemployment rate amongst the three groups, the differences between the three have narrowed from 1999 to 2013 with unemployment rate for labour force with intermediate education level dropping from 23.90% in 1999 to 7.94% in 2013. At the same time, unemployment rates for labour force with intermediate education level in Nigeria and the DRC have seen no drastic change, while unemployment rates for labour force with basic and advanced education levels have in Nigeria both increased from 2016 to 2019 and in DRC further polarized (meaning decreased unemployment rate for basic education group and increased unemployment rate for advanced education group) from 2005 to 2012.

On the overall level, total unemployment rates in the three SSA countries have all been in the single digit – see Figure 9. Total unemployment rate in Nigeria was the highest among the three in 2019 after a close to 4% jump from 2015 to 2017; total unemployment rate in the DRC had an increase of 1.65% over the time period 2005-2013 and had stabilized at around 4.3% since;

Figure 9.

Total Unemployment (% of Total Labour Force) in Nigeria, DRC and Ethiopia



Note. This graph is created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)* (data last updated on 2020/7/1).

total unemployment rate in Ethiopia had been on a downward trend ever since 1999, except the small climb in 2008-2010, and had been the lowest among the three countries' since 2004, staying at around 2.1% up to 2019.

International Labour Organization (ILO) confirms the finding that the local unemployment rate is not remarkably high in regions including Africa, where employment quality, instead of quantity, poses as a more pressing concern – “[i]ndividuals find themselves in low-quality jobs (and informal jobs) more than they find themselves jobless” (ILOSTAT, 2019, p.10). Indeed, large numbers of “Working Poor” (employed individuals living in poverty) exist among the employed Nigerians, Congolese and Ethiopians: when one evaluates extreme working poverty at \$1.90 per day in 2011 PPP, that amounts to in 2019, 37% of total employment in Nigeria, 69% in the DRC and 24% in Ethiopia; there were a further 25% of the employed Nigerians, 18% of the employed Congolese and 39% of the employed Ethiopians in moderate working poverty, defined by income at \$1.90 to \$3.20 per day in 2011 PPP, and a further 21%, 9% and 24% of the employed Nigerians, Congolese and Ethiopians respectively in near working poverty, defined by income at \$3.20-\$5.50 per day in 2011 PPP (ILOSTAT, n.d.). Therefore, considering the growing workforce in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia, two aspects exist – providing *enough* job opportunities to transform the human capital into economic output, and ensuring the *quality* of the jobs to safeguard this transformation effect. Under this light, Swiss and the EU’s increasing focus on decent job creation, by targeting both the quantity and quality aspects of jobs, is very fitting to the domestic labour market needs of the three SSA countries.

Element Migration:

Given limited job opportunities in a country and the need of labour in other countries, one may consider internationalize the labour market and grant jobs abroad to the surplus labour force whose productive power their own country could not absorb at that moment in time. This is labour migration or mobility.

The EU and Switzerland have both recognized that while there are negative effects associated with irregular migration, there are also positive contributions to development as a result of regular migration – for example, via remittances. Table 7 below shows that remittance inflow in Nigeria has indeed taken up a noticeable share of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Recalling that EU and Swiss migration dialogues have centred on curbing irregular migration and protecting those already on the way, the figures of Nigerian, Congolese and Ethiopian refugees are relevant. Further, as a majority of Swiss and a certain part of EU development assistance in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia have been directed at the internally displaced and the refugees, understanding the scale of human displacement in the regions helps grasping the potential effect of such development policies. In 2018, Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia hosted seventh-, third- and eighth-largest internally displaced population in the world²² (UNDP, 2019a), showing that while the sizeable populations in the three countries give theoretical ground for large-scale economic growth, fragility and resulted large-scale internal displacement may give conditions of reality different from the original envision. Thus the levels of refugees from the three SSA countries and internally displaced persons within the national borders to some degree explain why irregular migration, instead of labour migration and mobility, has been at the centre of Swiss and EU local development involvements in spite of the theoretical need of the latter.

Table 7.

Information on Remittances, Refugees by Country of Origin and Internally Displaced Persons for Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia

Country	Remittances, inflows	Refugees by country of origin	Internally displaced persons
	(% of GDP)	(thousands)	(thousands)
	2018	2018 ^b	2018
Nigeria	6.12	276.9	2,216.0
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	2.98	716.4	3,081.0
Ethiopia	0.49	92.2	2,137.0

Note. ^b= Data refer to people recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention, the 1967 UN Protocol and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention. In the absence of government figures, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.

Data in this table is from UNDP, *2019 Human Development Data All Tables and Dashboards*.

²² “In the world” as out of the 189 countries and six other countries or territories used in the UNDP *2019 Human Development Data All Tables and Dashboards*.

5 Conclusion

In summary, this paper asks, “To what extent do development strategies capture the upcoming demographic dividend in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia?”, as it is a question both of relevancy and necessity. The world is going to see a different population dynamic this century, and its accompanying opportunities and challenges are relevant to us all. From 2020 to 2100, Africa will be the only continent on earth to have a significant population growth prospect, both in absolute and world percentage terms, while Europe is going to undergo a 118-million drop in its absolute population size and Asia a significant 16.14% decrease in its global population share.²³ This comes with significant social, economic and political implications for both the subject continent and the rest of the world, as population is the main engine behind economic production and social engagement, and the world we live in today is more interconnected than ever.

This paper leverages on the concept of “demographic dividend,” more specifically, the “first demographic dividend” to understand the opportunities presented by this domestic population growth of the three most populous SSA countries (Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia) and evaluates Swiss and EU development strategies from this lens. Recalling that the first demographic dividend is the economic growth potential associated with a higher working-age to dependent population ratio, the overlaps of development strategies and demographic dividend contain that of the “Pre-Conditions” (health and education) and the “Translation Factor” (employment, which can be further subdivided into domestic employment and employment abroad).

²³ Table 8 below gives the numerical background information to this discussion on the upcoming world demographic composition change based on *WPP2019* median variant projection.

Table 8.

Continental Population Prospects 2020-2100 (WPP2019 median variant projection)

Continent	Total population (in thousands)			Continental population as a percentage of total world population		
	2020	2100	Difference	2020	2100	Difference
Africa	1 340 598	4 280 127	2 939 529	17.20%	39.36%	22.16%
Asia	4 641 055	4 719 907	78 852	59.54%	43.40%	-16.14%
Europe	747 636	629 563	- 118 073	9.59%	5.79%	-3.80%
Latin America and the Caribbean	653 962	679 993	26 031	8.39%	6.25%	-2.14%
Northern America	368 870	490 889	122 019	4.73%	4.51%	-0.22%
Oceania	42 678	74 916	32 238	0.55%	0.69%	0.14%

Note. Data in this table is from United Nations *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.*

Upon developing the Demographic-Dividend-Relevancy Tool based on such elements and channelling the relevant Swiss and EU development strategies through the Tool, this paper has first arrived at several interesting observations. First of all, Switzerland and the EU have many commonalities regarding their international development strategies: both of them centre on poverty reduction/eradication and sustainable development, both of them aim at addressing the “root causes,” including the root causes of poverty and the root causes of irregular migration, and both of them have in the recent years sought increasing strategic integration of migration in development cooperation. Secondly, strategy differences exist between those on the overarching and/or continental level and those on the country level: on the overarching and/or continental level, both Swiss and EU development strategies put all four DDR Elements (health, education, local employment and migration) on the priority list, with increasing emphasis on the latter two in the past few years; however, when it comes to bilateral country relations, health becomes the main remaining DDR Element in focus and emphasis on education becomes much lightened. Indeed, on the overarching level, health and education have been considered by both Switzerland and the EU as key components to human development, an aspect integral to sustainable development, but on the country level, under a more practical light, health has been prioritised as a most basic human need provision needed to be assisted in the fragile contexts, and education has been more directly linked to employment. This reflects the multi-levelness of policy orientation, the ideological built on the value system and the practical in face of the reality.

Should we mention “reality,” Section 4 gave a basic match of Swiss and EU development strategies to the three SSA countries’ domestic realities. What came out was that while Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia have all since the beginning of the century undergone noticeable growth in economic, health and educational aspects, in ways of many indicators and indexes, the roads for economic and human development ahead for them remain long, and thus does Swiss and EU international development strategies’ goal on poverty reduction/eradication and sustainable development remain relevant. Indeed, without proper human development, economic production would be limited. In face of various health challenges, Switzerland and the EU’s development efforts would be helpful in safeguarding Nigerians, Congolese and Ethiopians’ basic health conditions, thus contributing to human capacity development. Meanwhile it is unclear how Switzerland and the EU have been and will, besides offering vocational skills training and education at a certain scale, engage with the education systems in the three countries, where the

correlation between education level and employment rate behaves in different ways than that in developed economies. As the growing job demand with the expanding labour force is foreseeable in the three countries and employment quality has also been found as a major concern, Switzerland and the EU's focus on not only *more* jobs but also *better* jobs finds strong compatibility. Further, the large numbers of refugees from and internally displaced persons within the three SSA countries closely link to Switzerland and the EU's high concern on irregular migration, and Switzerland and the EU's integration of domestic employment aspects in their migration focus – including providing returnees with vocational education and training to better their future domestic employment prospects and improving domestic employment and economic environments as a mean to eradicate the root causes of forced and irregular migration – sheds new light on possible dynamic between migration and employment.

In short, the answer this paper has gained to its question is: **Swiss and EU international development strategies help the capturing of upcoming demographic dividend in the three SSA countries by supporting the local pre-conditions, especially health, and to a certain level and in various ways the translation factor of employment, mainly domestic employment.** The emphasis on health is Switzerland and the EU's response to fragile and/or conflict-afflicted or post-conflict contexts, and the main focus on the domestic aspect of employment leaves space for envisioning how the world would or could look like if foreign solutions to employment would be more ample and available, especially in this century when a great number of countries will experience population aging, with some even population shrinking, in stark contrast to the projected upcoming population, and most remarkably *working-age* population, boom in Africa. Indeed, there are two ways of arriving at an integrated solution to employment: one that integrates across the international labour markets – which corresponds to the current domestic/foreign employment divide – and one that centres within a domestic boundary but integrates different sectors. The latter is significant as it builds a dynamic domestic ecosystem that is usually more easily accessible to a larger part of the local population than a foreign solution, and as different elements of this integrated system can mutually reinforce each other's positive progress, it has potential for driving faster overall local development. Nevertheless, with that being said, this paper has taken employment as an explicit focal area itself when examining the strategy papers and has not dived into other strategic sectoral focuses – for example, agriculture, infrastructure, and so on

– for their contained implication to employment, leaving the second type of integrated employment solution an open question for further research.

Open fields for further research include also the following three: (1) the Second and the Third Demographic Dividends and their implications to development strategies; (2) domestic development strategies instead of international development strategies; (3) strategy implementation instead of orientation.

All in all, Swiss and EU development strategies in Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia, with their attention on fragility and merits in securing provision for basic human needs, remind us that while economic concepts like “demographic dividend” can unveil great economic potential on a theoretical level, realities must also be first understood and basic human needs fulfilled – otherwise, in the first demographic dividend’s case, the output-generating “translation factor” would not yield optimal results given a human capital input that has been significantly negatively affected by issues including food insecurity and malnutrition, lack of access to safe water, quality health care and education, and so on. Further, while the three SSA countries may have many similarities in upcoming opportunity prospects and current challenges, due attention must also be paid to the specificities of their own individual circumstances – for example, Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia all have a substantial share of the “Working Poor,” but the distribution of working poverty from the extreme to the near ends and the national economic structure and conditions all do vary among the three – so to arrive at most effective engagement. At the same time, when engaging with the topic development or development strategy, one ought to remember the two big guiding questions that are still open for further exploration – What indicates development? Development of what?

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
VI. List of Support and Aids Used

www.deepl.com has been used as a translation aid for the author when understanding documents in non-English languages, namely French and German; however, given the author's own basic to intermediate level skill in French and German, the author is not solely dependent on www.deepl.com and has utilized it only as a support.

VII. Annex


ANNEX A. Swiss Bilateral ODA to Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia and Its Humanitarian Aid Makeup

Figure A-1.




Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from *Annual Reports of Swiss International Cooperation* (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) and *Statistics* (2008, 2009, 2017, 2018). ODA data here adopts the real value (as documented in the *Annual Report* or *Statistics* in the year after the concerning year) when possible; non-humanitarian-aid ODA amount for Nigeria 2018 may be the budget number as it was based on total ODA amount recorded in the subject year. When there is no specified mentioning in the *Annual Report* or *Statistics*, the entry value is 0, even though the Swiss contribution to Nigeria in this year may be positive but was included in the group category of “Other countries” and “Regions and classified” for total ODA and “Other countries and regions” for humanitarian aid.

Figure A-2.



Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from *Annual Reports of Swiss International Cooperation* (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) and *Statistics* (2008, 2009, 2017, 2018). ODA data here adopts the real value (as documented in the *Annual Report* or *Statistics* in the year after the concerning year) when possible; humanitarian aid amount for 2005 was the 2005 budget; non-humanitarian-aid ODA amounts for year 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2018 may be budget numbers as those were based on total ODA numbers recorded in the subject year. When there is no specified mentioning in the *Annual Report* or *Statistics*, the entry value is 0, even though the Swiss contribution to the DRC in this year may be positive but was included in the group category of “Other countries” and “Regions and classified” for total ODA and “Other countries and regions” for humanitarian aid.


Figure A-3.



Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from *Annual Reports of Swiss International Cooperation* (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) and *Statistics* (2008, 2009, 2017, 2018). ODA data here adopts the real value (as documented in the Annual Report or Statistics in the year after the concerning year) when possible; humanitarian aid amount for 2005 was the 2005 budget; non-humanitarian-aid ODA amount for 2008 was based on the 2008 budget; non-humanitarian-aid ODA amounts for year 2003, 2004 and 2018 may be budget numbers as those were based on total ODA numbers recorded in the subject year. When there is no specified mentioning in the *Annual Report* or *Statistics*, the entry value is 0, even though the Swiss contribution to Ethiopia in this year may be positive but was included in the group category of “Other countries” and “Regions and classified” for total ODA and “Other countries and regions” for humanitarian aid.


ANNEX B. Historical GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD) Values for Nigeria, the DRC and Ethiopia

Figure B-1.




Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)* (data last updated on 2020/7/1).

Figure B-2.




Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)* (data last updated on 2020/7/1).

Figure B-3.



Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)* (data last updated on 2020/7/1).

Figure B-4.



Note. The graph is created by the author based on data from the World Bank, *GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)* (data last updated on 2020/7/1).


Declaration of authorship

“I hereby declare

- that I have written this thesis without any help from others and without the use of documents and aids other than those stated in the references,
- that I have mentioned all the sources used and that I have cited them correctly according to established academic citation rules,
- that the topic or parts of it are not already the object of any work or examination of another course unless this explicitly stated,
- that I am aware that my work can be electronically checked for plagiarism and that I hereby grant the University of St. Gallen copyright as far as this is required for this administrative action.”

Date and Signature

16 NOV 2020

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a stylized 'Z' followed by a large, sweeping loop that ends in a small circle.